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Abstract 
 
The idea of bankruptcy for insolvent sovereign borrowers has been under discussion 
for a long time, yet has never been implemented. This paper presents various proposed 
solutions to apply bankruptcy reorganization principles to sovereign debt crises. The 
current international framework is inadequate and lacks the efficiency of a working 
bankruptcy system. This paper analyses the case for an international institutional 
arrangement to deal with sovereign debt problems considering underlying problems in 
sovereign credit markets. It finds that certain well-designed sovereign bankruptcy 
procedures may be one step toward a better international institutional arrangement. 
However, in order to have any chance to be successful these procedures need to be 
complemented by a broad set of (international) policy measures in other areas.  
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Überlegung, ein Insolvenzverfahren für souveräne Schuldner einzurichten, ist 
keineswegs neu, wurde jedoch nie in die Praxis umgesetzt. In der vorliegenden Arbeit 
werden unterschiedliche Lösungsansätze vorgestellt, die versuchen, zentrale Prinzipien 
einer insolvenzbedingten Reorganisation auf Länderschuldenkrisen anzuwenden.  Die 
gegenwärtige internationale Finanzarchitektur weist nicht die notwendige Effizienz auf, 
um ein angemessen funktionierendes Insolvenzverfahren nach Muster der 
Firmeninsolvenz nachzustellen. In der Arbeit werden daher die zugrundeliegenden 
Probleme in internationalen Kreditmärkten untersucht; ferner wird der Frage 
nachgegangen, ob eine institutionelle Regelung für souveräne Schuldenprobleme 
sinnvoll ist. Aus den Überlegungen geht in erster Linie hervor, dass eine institutionelle 
Regelung einen Schritt in Richtung effizienterer Mechanismen darstellen kann. Um 
jedoch auf breiter Basis erfolgreich zu sein, bedarf es gleichzeitig einer Reihe von 
komplementären Maßnahmen im internationalen Finanzsystem.  
 
Resumen1 
 
La idea de construir un procedimiento de insolvencia para paises soberanos no es de 
ningun modo nueva. Sin embargo nunca fue puesta en práctica. En este trabajo se 
presentarán diferentes modos de acercamiento al problema que datan de distintas 
épocas. Estos acercamientos buscan aplicar principios de la reorganización después de 
la bancarrota en paises endeudados en crisis. La estructura internacional financiera 
actual es inadecuada y no presenta un sistema de insolvencia aplicable. El presente 
trabajo presenta los fundamentales problemas de los mercados de crédito mundiales y 
pone en duda la eficacia de la regulación institucional para solventar las deudas de los 
estados soberanos. Se llega a la conclusión que una regulación institucional de las 
deudas sería un paso seguro en la solución de los problemas. Sin embargo, para obtener 
resultados positivos sería necesario una análoga revisión del sistema de finanzas 
internacionales. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Dedicated to policy-makers in Buenos Aires  
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1. Introduction 
 
“When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same 
manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, 
and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least 
dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor.”2 
 
This statement by Adam Smith in 1776 is presumably the first known reference 
to the necessity of a functional sovereign bankruptcy3 procedure. It is astonishing how 
topical his statement is today. In a slightly different context, one can hear similar 
statements such as the following: 
 
“We lack adequate incentives for orderly and timely restructuring of 
unsustainable sovereign debts. This can impose unnecessarily heavy economic 
costs on debtor countries; it can undermine the value of creditor claims; and it 
can leave the international community confronting an unpalatable choice 
between a disruptive unilateral default or bailing out private creditors and 
contributing to moral hazard.”4  
 
These words were spoken by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) First 
Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger in June 2002.  
 
Krueger’s words represent a general diagnosis of sovereign debt problems at 
present. Debt has been the largest source of capital flows from developed countries to 
developing countries in the past 50 years. Particularly since the 1970s lending to 
developing countries has increased drastically. At the same time international financial 
integration has been moving forward liberalizing trade and capital accounts. The capital 
flows have enabled a transfer of resources, yet have mostly not brought along succesful 
economic development. The resulting debt build-up has led to serious repayment 
problems and occasionally default on debt. The present framework of debt 
restructuring5 has proven to be inadequate in dealing with the underlying problems.  
                                                 
2 Smith, Adam (1776), p. 590. The context in which Adam Smith made his statement was different than 
the circumstances today. The “dishonourability” of the debtor in the “Wealth of Nations” results from 
the governments policy to devalue the real value of debt through seignorage or, as Smith calls it, “the 
raising of the denomination of the coin” (p. 589).  
3 In this paper, the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency”are used as synonyms, whereas bankruptcy is the 
more commonly used name. The term “sovereign” in turn is to be understood as a synonym for 
“country” or  “state”. Sovereign is an appropriate label to underline the sovereign nature of the debtor 
state. 
4 Krueger, Anne (2002b), Speech at the Bretton Woods Committee Annual Meeting, June 6th 2002. 
5 The term “restructuring” in this paper includes both rescheduling and write-down of debt.  
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 The recent history of sovereign debt crises reveals a progression. In the 80s, 
academics were mainly concerned with protracted sovereign debt workouts and 
especially negative externalities that arise from them. In the 90s, the reasons for 
sovereign default were broadened through the emergence of self-fulfilling panic runs on 
debt. Despite of the (moving) consensus on the underlying problems there has been 
less consensus on how to address these problems. Only very recently the gap has 
narrowed among key actors. This paper presents the current debate and attempts to 
introduce a good selection of different ideas from different times and angles. How 
should the international community deal with the insolvency of a sovereign state? Is the 
reform of sovereign bankruptcy procedures justified and feasible?  
1.1. Rationale for the Study 
 
How should the international community deal with the insolvency of a 
sovereign state? Before going on to examine the history, theory and policy of 
sovereign bankruptcy, the reader should be aware of a few guiding questions important 
for this study. 
 
Why is the establishment of a functional sovereign bankruptcy procedure a 
challenging undertaking?  
 
The central challenge one is confronted with in the case of sovereign 
bankruptcy procedures is the international adaptation of regulatory systems designed 
for private market actors. The attempt to govern sovereign conduct on the largely 
unregulated international arena involves a number of pitfalls. While the economic and 
legal rationale for a rule-based international sovereign bankruptcy regime may be 
unchallenged, the problem rises when moving from the rationale to the regime itself. 
The case of sovereign bankruptcy involves a complex set of concurrent problems. Take 
for example the concept of debtor valuation, underlying to domestic corporate 
bankruptcy legislation determining any firm’s viability. The concept of the calculation 
of the value of a sovereign’s assets fails. In principle, a country is always solvent. Only 
its government can be insolvent. A highly indebted country could also raise taxes and 
cut expenditure in order to acquire the necessary assets for repayment. However, an 
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excessive practice of these measures is practically equal to political and economic 
suicide. The negative externalities that are created in such a situation for the whole 
economy move to the center of the problem. A sovereign bankruptcy procedure 
therefore requires careful mechanism design. 
 
Why is this a good timing for assessing new sovereign bankruptcy procedures?  
 
At the end of 2001 Argentina was heading toward drastic devaluation and 
dramatic default on debt in a so called „slow motion train crash“. Obviously motivated 
by this disastrous development, Anne Krueger from the IMF surprised the 
international community. In November 2001 she called for a statutory mechanism 
creating a new sovereign debt workout procedure called Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM hereafter).6  
 
The IMF has pushed fiercely for market liberalization worldwide. For this 
purpose, it had opposed measures preventing the free flow of capital. As of November 
2001, it had an influental staff member advocating a number of elements of domestic 
bankruptcy to be applied to sovereign states. Krueger’s proposal had a catalytic effect 
on the present debate. The new debate is now slightly over a year old, yet it has some 
predecessors from the 1980s and also between 1995-2000. Earlier discussions all 
remained fruitless academic disputes with little hopes of being adapted into policy. The 
IMF’s Board of Directors has repeatedly discussed details of a feasible procedure after 
August 2002.7 The present debate has become a central issue on the international 
community’s policy agenda. Therefore it also carries a lively promise of an operational 
outcome.  
1.2. Structure of the Analysis 
 
In this paper, the argumentation follows the progression “History – Theory – 
Policy”. It starts out by examining present sovereign debt management, moves on to 
outline the underlying problems of the present financial system and concludes with 
proposals for possible future management of sovereign debt. The second chapter 
                                                 
6 Krueger (2001) A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring”, speech at the National 
Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner, Washington DC, November 26. 
7 IMF Public Information Notice (2003) 0306, January 7th. 
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provides a broad historical survey of sovereign debt crises and looks into the past and 
present resolution mechanisms of unsustainable sovereign debt. It also examines 
important concepts on the sustainability of a sovereign’s debt burden. The third chapter 
analyzes the theory of bankruptcy and evaluates the problems that may arise when 
bankruptcy procedures are applied to sovereign debtors. This analysis involves the 
incentives of creditors, the incentives of the sovereign debtor and problems in the 
official sector’s approach (IMF policies). The theoretical underpinnings work to 
facilitate understanding of the fourth chapter. It reviews the history of policy proposals 
starting with early contributions but emphasising the present debate. The survey 
selectively deepens the scope on important proposals. It broadly divides the proposals 
in two camps: those that require statutory reform (i.e. changes in law) and those that 
require contractual reform (changes in debt contracts). The survey closes with an 
assessment of feasibility for contemporary policy and attempts to predict policy 
outcomes. 
 
2. Sovereign Debt  
2.1 Sovereign Debt Crises 
 
The history of sovereign debt problems presumably started with the very 
inception of international lending. Today the most severe problems of sovereign debt, 
at least the ones that occasionally lead to default and crisis, affect mainly the developing 
and emerging market world. Yet history reveals that the problems have hit a broader 
range of sovereigns. In the Great Depression of the 1930s, both the UK and France 
defaulted on their debt in favour of the needs of their people. In South America, the 
continent most associated with debt problems today, the problems began as the 
Mexican government suspended its debt payments in 1914. In 1956, Argentina was 
experiencing serious debt problems and served as an impetus for its bilateral creditor 
nations to create the arrangement known today as the Paris Club. This informal 
restructuring mechanism has reached 360 decisions for 78 debtor nations ever since.8  
 
                                                 
8 See www.clubdeparis.org -> Presentation. 
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Reckless borrowing by western creditors (mainly commercial banks) during the 
70s, together with the absence of the financial know-how and sustainable policies in 
debtor countries, eventually contributed to massive debt problems of the developing 
world. Private capital flows to developing countries had grown enormously compared 
to official flows. What resulted was a series of debt crises in the 80s. It was Mexico 
again in 1982 where the crisis first hit. The decade of the 80s also became known as the 
“lost decade”. This was mainly because the repercussions of the widespread crises and a 
massive debt overhang turned economic growth negative in the entire developing 
world, and especially in Latin America.9 During this time, market-based schemes for 
debt reduction were introduced. In these schemes, the debtor country would buy back 
debt at discounted prices and try to increase domestic growth through a set of domestic 
policies specified in the schemes.  
 
As the market-based approach did not prove to be the ultimate solution 
because debt write-down mostly remained below necessary levels, the schemes were 
combined with official sector (US government) coordination and funding to facilitate 
their adoption. This policy went into history as the Brady-plan.10 The basic idea of the 
Brady-plan was to increase the certainty of servicing the debt by collateralizing the 
principal with US Treasury securities in return for some forgiveness in debt. Syndicated 
commercial bank loans were converted into Brady-bonds, eventually sold to private 
investors. Bonds now allowed the debt to be traded in financial markets, where it was 
priced at market value. This way they triggered secondary markets for sovereign bonds 
to develop, paving the way for the golden age of emerging market bonds in the first 
half of the 1990s. The bonds effectively substituted traditional bank-loan finance of 
sovereigns. The development was complemented by widespread capital account 
liberalizations. All this resulted in a pool of capital flows into emerging markets roughly 
six times as large between 1991-97 as between 1984-90.11 By 1995 bonds made out two 
thirds of emerging market debt. Notwithstanding its undisputable merits, the Brady-
                                                 
9 For a detailed survey on the debt crisis of the 80s see e.g. Cline (1995). 
10 This happened in many Latin American countries but also in parts of Africa. Nicholas Brady was the 
(then) treasury secretary of the USA. 
11 $188 vs. $1000, however declining since 1997. See White (2002), p.17. 
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plan was not a global success as most of the poorest countries did not enjoy the new 
tools of securitized finance.12 
 
As if every new round of crises started in Mexico, it was the Mexican “tequila 
crisis” in 1994/95 to present a panic-induced “self-fulfilling run”. In fear of the 
Mexican government’s inability to honour its obligations on the foreign currency 
indexed short-term bonds (the so called tesobonos), investors “ran” from the peso. This 
run proved unprecedentedly disastrous to national liquidity and was eventually settled 
only through massive capital injection by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF. Similar runs 
on the currency that had disastrous consequences for the government budget occurred 
also in Russia (1998) and Turkey (2000/01). The biggest sovereign default in history 
occured when Argentina defaulted on $141 billion of sovereign debt in 2002.  
 
Runs on debt that have disastrous consequences for the state budget must not 
always inflict a sovereign debtor in the first step. For example, the East Asian financial 
crisis (1997-98) revolved mainly around private debt. Although prima facie unaffected, 
the run can hit the sovereign state’s debt burden indirectly. Such a situation occurs 
when a (fixed) exchange rate collapses as foreign exchange reserves of the central bank 
deplete and/or when the government is forced to bailout the banking system with 
astronomic sums to prevent financial collapse13 (e.g. South Korea, Thailand and 
Indonesia in 1997/98).   
 
Throughout both remarkable periods of sovereign debt crises (the debt crises in 
the 1980s as well as since 1995), there have been various efforts to restructure 
sovereign debt. With the emergence of bond lending the problem of restructuring 
became harder. While bank loans in the 80s involved at best a few dozens of lenders, 
the creditor base holding bonds often involves thousands of (often anynomous) 
                                                 
12 The poorest low-income countries were still suffering from an unchanged massive debt overhang and 
the new bonded debt did not reach them.  
13 Investors race to sell their domestic financial assets and converte local currency into dollars. This 
exerts immense pressure on the exchange rate and eventually causes it to depreciate. The necessary action 
by the country in order to stop the immense capital outflow and defend the exchange rate often involves 
raising interest rates, which in turn does substantial damage to the real economy. The high interest rates 
contribute simultaneously to default in local and foreign currency debt, since repayment costs have risen. 
Bad debts pile up with the domestic banking industry, the government is forced to bail out the banks, 
and the recipe for a “twin-crisis”, a concurrent banking- and currency crisis, is perfect (See “third 
generation crisis models”, e.g. Chang/Velasco (1998)).  
  -6-
creditors. Meanwhile due to the disorderly crises, the capital flows to the developing 
world have reversed. Since 1997 there has been a remarkable decrease in capital flows.14 
 
2.2 Curren  Sovereign Debt Procedures  t
                                                
 
Sovereign debt can generally be divided into four categories. These are debt 
owed to International Finance Institutions15 (IFI hereafter), bilateral loans to 
governmental creditors, commercial loans to banks and private loans owed to 
bondholders.16 A further classification of claims could be according to seniority of 
claims or their respective date of issue (bonds).17  
 
The access to sovereign debt is not uniform all over the world. Developed 
countries are able to raise securitized capital in the form of treasury bonds. The same 
applies for middle-income countries (emerging markets), albeit with higher costs of 
capital due to the riskier situation. These countries have multiple creditor classes 
including numerous private sector creditors (banks, bondholders, multilaterals, 
suppliers) in their portfolios. The low-income countries (e.g. Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC)) are left with mostly bilateral loans by other governments as well as 
multilateral assistance by the IFI. The classification into low- and middle-income 
countries in this paper is somewhat vague and not to be overestimated in meaning.18 
However it is an interesting distinction when laying out reformed mechanisms to deal 
with sovereign debt, as certain remedy only applies to certain form of debt. For 
example, many of the proposals discussed in the fourth chapter concentrating on bond 
finance are unlikely to be of great help for HIPC debt.  
 
 
 
14 See White (2002), p. 12. 
15 Mainly the IMF and World Bank Group. 
16 See White (2002) p.15. 
17“In this paper, “creditor classes” is a classification of debt. It differentiates within the form of debt 
according to seniority and/or date of issue. 
18 Country classification into low-income countries (annual GNP less than $755 per capita, including 
HIPCs) and middle-income countries (GNP>$755) listed according to World Bank classification at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/class.htm. (12.12.2002). Middle-income countries include 
countries such as Argentina, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico and a number of East Asian countries. (also referred 
to as investment grade countries).  
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2.2.1. Loans by the IFI and the Paris and London Clubs  
 
The IFI loans by the World Bank and the IMF enjoy a de facto senior priority. 
Loans that are granted by these institutions also have an exceptionally good repayment 
record.19 Under the present provisions, funding from the IFI are mostly attached to a 
set of conditionality in the debtors policies. In exchange for the loan, the debtor nation 
commits to make adjustments in its policies.20 Faced with a continuosly worsening debt 
situation of the developing world, the IMF and the World Bank jointly launched the 
HIPC-initiative in 1996. Its objective was to provide debt relief for countries facing 
unsustainable debt burdens and agreeing to implement an IMF and World Bank 
program. The HIPC-initiative requires the debtor to continue following 
macroeconomic structural adjustment policies and some social policy reforms in health 
and education. The IFI then judge the success of these policies and grant debt relief 
accordingly. By March 2002, only 26 countries had qualified for debt reductions. For 
these countries the HIPC will write-down $40 billion, equalling around half of what 
they owe.21  
 
Bilateral loans by governments, at least for a large part, are negotiated in the 
Paris Club. Commercial bank debt is negotiated in the London Club (since 1976). 
Neither club is an independent bankruptcy procedure, but informal associations of 
official and commercial creditors respectively who determine the debt restructuring for 
a country when claims are due. The Paris Club’s decisions require unanimity. The 
London Club does not require unanimity, but decisions have generally involved the 
consent of 90-95% of commercial creditors. Paris Club negotiations are usually rapid 
(historic max. of 15 months) as substantial free-rider problems are not likely to emerge 
between the same limited set of industrial countries and the debtor merely possesses a 
right to be heard, not to decide. In contrast, the London Club is much slower with 
                                                 
19 This is a de facto and not de jure priority (White 2002, p. 13). Although Bulow (2002) argues that “creditors 
like the IFI, who disproportinately make loans when everyone else wants to take money out and diproportionately get paid 
off when there are, effectively, other creditors willing to buy them out at face value, are economically junior.” (p. 9) This 
paper will not dwell on differing concepts on credit seniority. For a discussion on the implications and 
the measurement of the good repayment record, see Rogoff (2002).  
20 For information on policy conditionality, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm 
(10.01.2003) Stiglitz (2002) argues that although one would expect the IMF to be an experienced crisis 
manager, exactly the opposite is true. The IMF advises countries to undertake exactly those policies that 
have turned out to aggravate problems in similar situations before. 
21 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm, visited 10.03.2003.  
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respect to the duration of the negotiations. The extreme case of the Polish negotiations 
starting in 1981 and taking nearly 14 years is an instructive example. This long 
timeframe can be explained: Banks have an incentive to take a tough stance in 
negotiations since a too favourable outcome with one country is likely to set a 
benchmark for future write-down for others.22 Notwithstanding the general provision 
of equal terms co-ordination among the two Clubs, often the Paris Club tends to give 
out more favourable terms due to political reasons.23 When the official sector gives out 
more favourable terms, it pays off for private institutions to wait. Waiting to be the last 
creditor to settle with the debtor is therefore a dominant strategy. This is a crucial 
failure, since delay of agreement is often very costly to the debtor. Creditors are in a 
superior negotiating position, and in the end the London Club often closes a 
negotiation having left harsh conditions for the debtor.24 The relief granted by London 
and Paris Club mechanisms provides an overindebted debtor with breathing space for a 
period of time. However, Sachs (2002) shows that merely 8 out of 60 developing 
countries with Paris Club restructuring schemes between 1975-96 have been considered 
cured. Twelve others are in a state of remission, and 40 remain in continuing crisis.  
 
The Paris Club and the IFI work in close cooperation. The IMF, according to 
its statutes, is supposed to make funding “temporarily available” for emergency relief.25 
Yet for around twenty years the IMF has provided continuous assistance to low-income 
countries with unpayable debts. Arguably, one of the biggest mistakes of the IFI (and 
many bilateral creditors) has been to determine debt sustainability solely on criteria such 
as low inflation and balanced budgets. While these are undeniably crucial components 
of any sustainable strategy, their exclusive and hard-headed compliance can abstract 
from alarm signals such as negative growth and consequently, an ever-revolving need to 
restructure, present in too many developing countries. “The unreality of the debt treatment is 
also evidenced by endless and thankless rounds of debt renegotiation and IMF agreements”.26 The 
                                                 
22 The Polish government was also to be blamed for the delay. It hoped to aquire an especially generous 
write-down in debt claiming that it was going to be a central force in the political transition process of 
Eastern Europe.  
23 For example, following the Hurricane Mitch in 1998, special concessions were made to Honduras and 
Nicaragua. 
24 See White (2002) p. 17. 
25 IMF Articles of Agreement (1944), Article I, Section V. 
26 See Sachs (2002), p. 8. For critique on IFI lending polcies, see Stiglitz (2002), Sachs (2002). The Paris 
Club and the IFI have used largely arbitrary formulas determining the degree of relief rather than 
seriously assessing the country’s unique circumstances. (Sachs 2002, p. 3) In 1988, the Paris Club first. 
  -9-
principle of debt relief in each restructuring round has been “to do the minimum possible, 
just enough to prevent outright disaster”.27 The ad hoc nature of the Paris and London Clubs 
has furthermore been claimed to be adding to uncertainty and intransparency of a debt 
restructuring process.  
 
2.2.2. Bond Finance  
  
The fourth group of creditors, the private bondholders, play a crucial role in 
debt problems today. With capital account liberalizations and financial integration of 
markets together with the following Brady-plan, bond finance gained enormous 
popularity in sovereign lending toward the end of the 1980s. This was especially the 
case with middle-income countries. The growth of the number of bonds issued has 
made communication among creditors (and between debtor and creditors) difficult and 
the terms to restructure harder. Bondholders are an anynomous mass lacking a forum 
to negotiate, nothing comparable to the “clubby” discussions in the Paris and London 
Clubs among diplomats and bankers. Eichengreen/Mody (2000) found that 44% of 
emerging market bonds under foreign jurisdictions are issued in the UK, 32% in the US 
and the rest mainly in Japan and Germany.28  
 
Bonds issued under UK law usually carry collective action clauses (CACs), as do 
some issued under Canadian and Japanese law. They allow for a majority of 
bondholders to change the payment terms of the bonds at bondholder meetings, 
subsequently binding for everybody. The qualifying majority requirement is usually set 
at 75-80%. On the other hand, US-issued bonds do not allow payment terms to be 
changed but by unanimity. Usually, US-issued bonds include clauses in contracts that 
allow terms of the bond to be changed as long as payment terms are left untouched. 
These “amendment clauses” or “exit consents” are voluntary in nature and enable 
creditors to accept a restructuring plan by the debtor.29 However, their non-binding 
                                                                                                                                         
granted an overall one-third reduction of debt burdens. This has been repeated three times, in increasing 
proportions each time. 
27 Sachs (2002), p. 9. 
28 Eichengreen/Mody (2000). These figures are subject to fluctuations. 
29 Exit consents are contractual amendments to existing bond contracts accepted by a simple majority of 
bondholders who have agreed to exchange those bonds for renegotiated debt (excluding payment terms). 
The attraction of not consenting as a minority bondholder is reduced if the old debt now contains 
undesirable contractual amendments.  
  -10-
nature can undermine their effectiveness in times of serious instability. As they do not 
allow for changes in payment terms, they are unlikely to provide decisive relief to the 
debtor. US bonds further give creditors the right to sue the debtor after default in order 
to accelerate payment.30 In contrast, UK bonds only allow the bond trustee to 
accelerate payment and sue the debtor country, additionally including pro rata sharing 
provisions among bondholders with regard to the recovery. Consequently, US 
bondholders have the incentive to sue the defaulting debtor for repayment. Cases of 
American creditors succesfully suing the debtor country, although fairly rare, include 
one prominent example: in one of them a private investment house, Elliott Associates, 
bought $20 million worth of commercial loans guaranteed by the Peruvian 
government.31 Following the attempt to restrucure, Elliott sued Peru in US courts for 
repayment. Elliott achieved an attachment order against all Peruvian assets in the US 
and Europe. Ultimately Peru settled, paying Elliott Associates $56 million.  
2.3. The Sustainability of a Debt Burden 
 
International capital flows carry the advantage of benefiting both source and 
destination countries, i.e. creditors and debtors. Creditors receive higher returns and are 
enabled to diversify their portfolios. Debtors in turn are enabled to invest more than 
domestic savings alone would allow. Capital flows to sovereign states are a significant 
part of international flows. Ideally, they are designed to finance public sector 
investment in infrastructure, health or education. If return on this “investment”32 is 
high, economic growth accelerates and debt-service is financed. The definition of debt 
sustainablility for a sovereign is by no means simple. For the sake of argument, take the 
debt-GDP ratio as a measure for sovereign debt sustainability. Defining sustainability as 
a non-increasing debt-GDP ratio can be dangerous as this measure is very sensitive to 
forecasts on growth, interest rates and budget deficits/surpluses. Notwithstanding the 
measurement problems it is suitable for the analytical case. The debt burden of a 
sovereign is considered sustainable as long as the debt-GDP ratio is constant or falling 
in the long run, given investment with a positive net present value (NPV).   
                                                 
30 Sometimes 25% of outstanding principal is required to accelerate the claim. 
31 Elliott Associates was a “vulture fund”. A vulture fund is a single creditor buying up other claims to 
increase the credit mass behind the legal claim and thus maximizing expected repayment. 
32 Obviously the term investment is to be understood in a very broad sense here. It comprises state 
activity in areas such as infrastructure, health, security and education which all provide the framework for 
tax revenue of the sovereign. 
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 2.3.1. Unsustainable Debt Burdens 
 
In the opposite case of a continuously rising debt-GDP ratio the debt burden of 
the sovereign at some point inevitably becomes unsustainable. In the situation of an 
unsustainable debt burden, the true NPV of debt will be below its face value and 
creditors (as a whole) have no chance to be repaid in full. In reality, a judgement of 
unsustainability must be on a probabilistic basis: there is always a remote chance that 
some very low-probability event will change the outlook. For example, it could be that 
the terms of trade will exceptionally shift in a country’s favour or new natural resources 
are discovered. In the recent case of Argentina, the debt burden is generally considered 
unsustainable. The IMF has, however, calculated that if primary fiscal surpluses 
together with growth and interest rates returned to pre-crisis levels, the debt burden 
could be sustainable.33  
 
As borrowing continues and the debt-GDP ratio rises, the probability of the 
country to service the NPV of existing contracts falls. Real interest rates in the debtor 
country will rise with the debt-GDP ratio. The higher interest rates make debt servicing 
more expensive. Increasing repayment obligations can function like a tax on domestic 
investment (Sachs 1984). Less investment lowers the growth of GDP, which causes the 
debt-GDP ratio to rise further. If the economy reaches the state where the real rate of 
GDP-growth plus the primary surplus of the sovereigns budget as percent of GDP 
remains less than total interest payments, an indefinite increase in the debt-GDP ratio 
occurs. There remains no other alternative than to restructure the debt and the sole 
escape out of this downward spiral is an appropriate debt write-down. A debt threshold 
exists as of where debt write-down increases the economy’s growth prospects, 
eventually reducing interest rates and debt repayable. Value is thus increased for both 
creditors and debtors. Forgiving debt can not only benefit debtors but also creditors as 
a write-down might offset higher growth and increase the likelihood of repayment  
 
The current account provides an important element next to the debt-GDP 
ratio. In an open economy, the current account can also be an indicator of debt 
                                                 
33 But recovery is only possible if a banking crisis is prevented and depositor confidence is restored. This 
train has long departed in Argentina. (Krueger 2003) 
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sustainability. Obstfeld/Rogoff (1996) present a model where in equilibrium, an 
economy’s present value of trade balances, i.e. the net output transfer to foreigners, 
equals the value of the economy’s initial debt to foreigners. In the framework, only if 
the country is able to produce trade balance surpluses the debt can be payed off. Yet 
even the current account and the debt-GDP ration together might not be enough to 
understand debt sustainability in practice. For example, in 1993 Australia had a debt-
GDP ratio of 54% and had been running persistent trade deficits since 1976. Faced 
with similar real burdens, Chile and Brazil could not avoid falling into a debt crisis a 
few years earlier.34 Australia never defaulted. Australia’s creditors, assured that 
economic reforms would follow, trusted trade surpluses to emerge in the near future. 
Australia’s avoidance of the crisis suggests that there are other factors at work. 
Creditors may fear that political and legal institutions in some countries are too weak to 
ensure future compliance with even moderately higher debt burdens. As countries with 
negative real burdens like Australia de facto borrow against future growth, the 
confidence of creditors into growth has to be strong enough. This was obviously not 
the case with Chile and Brazil. If countries are suddenly prevented to borrow against 
future growth as this is not expected to materialize, a cutoff in lending itself increases 
the present value of servicing existing debt. If creditors do not expect the situation to 
get better, a debt crisis can have self-fulfilling elements.    
 
2.3.2. Solvent but Illiquid 
 
Consider the case where a sovereign is forced to default on its debt repayment 
even though the NPV of its assets and liabilities is judged positive. A creditworthy 
sovereign may experience this problem because its assets are less liquid than its 
liabilities. Both theory and experience suggest two different reasons for default on debt. 
The overall amount of debt may be unsustainable. But it may also be the case that the 
country is just not able to meet its obligations in the short run, that is, it is solvent but 
illiquid. This is said to having been the case with Mexico (1995), Thailand (1997/8), 
Korea (1997/8), Indonesia (1997/8) and Brazil (1998) in the second half of the 90s.35  
                                                 
34 Obstfeld/Rogoff (1996), p. 67. Similar figures as for Australia apply for the USA at present (January 
2003). 
35 Illiquidity was observed to be the case especially because of the countries’s avoidance of default in 
private claims and early repayment of loans provided. 
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 Bankruptcy due to pure illiquidity is most unlikely to happen to a perfectly 
solvent debtor. Some degree of weakness in the policies of the sovereign is generally 
required to trigger repayment fears among creditors. The exchange rate regime is a 
prominent example: a number of low- and middle-income countries have had 
(politically motivated) fixed exchange rates in the recent past. Fixed rates do not allow 
for exchange rate adjustment to macroeconomic fundamentals. When borrowing in 
another currency, the countries subject themselves to a serious currency mismatch. 
Next to mismatches in currency, grave mismatches in maturity contribute to the 
acuteness of the liquidity problem. The serious manifestation of both mismatches in 
many emerging market economies has been referred to as “original sin” 
(Ricardo/Hausmann 2000). Original sin relates to a sovereign’s inability to use its own 
currency to borrow, together with an inability to borrow long-term. The monetary 
policy of the debtor is not trusted as he could reduce the real value of debt through 
seignorage if he were able to borrow in the own currency.36 As a result, the sovereign 
will only be able to borrow in a “hard currency”. The short-term nature of the debt 
arises as creditors anticipate the possibility of default and borrow only short-term.37 
Short-term borrowing carries an inherent problem: it facilitates the possibility of self-
fulfilling runs on debt as the decision on rollover of the credit line is due more 
frequently.  
 
2.3.3. Insolvent or Illiquid? 
 
An appropriate concept of insolvency and illiquidity is necessary in order to 
adequately identify and assess the economic measures that need to be taken in 
sovereign bankruptcy. Especially during the debt crisis of the 80s, crucial 
misjudgements were made in this matter, as the debt crisis was claimed to be a problem 
of illiquidity.38 Insolvency requires a careful assessment of its degree followed by an 
                                                 
36 The argument was als Adam Smith’s (1776) motivation for a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. 
37 In an attempt to endogenize the maturity structure of sovereign debt, Jeanne (2001) shows how the 
global financial system, left to itself, tends to give rise to dangerous forms of finance. 
38 Although the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency was made at a relatively early stage, the debt 
problems of the 80ies were mainly attributed to illiquidity. One argument was that the outstanding 
amount of debt equalled “only” about a fifth of annual national income (GNP). If every household 
waived largely a few monthly incomes, the country would be able to pay back this amount without 
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appropriate write-down. In case of illiquidity, no loss should materialize in any form 
affecting creditors.  
 
Especially in the light of the developments in the 90s some contemporary 
theorists no longer believe that it is necessary to draw a sharp line between runs on 
debt and solvency crises.39 For several reasons, they are very difficult to distinguish in 
practice. The distinction is made ambiguous because short-term debt, a characteristic of 
emerging market economies prone to a liquidity crisis, can be a reflection of “solvency” 
problems. Moreover, when sovereign debt is subject to a run the actual solvency can 
easily be diminished. The fundamentally adverse effects of a run occur, whether the run 
is on an ex-ante solvent or insolvent debtor. An analogy to the two-period 
Diamond/Dybvig (1983) debtor-multiple-creditor framework illustrates how illiquidity 
carries the potential to lead to insolvency. If the liquid assets of the sovereign are not 
enough to pay some of the debt due in period 1 and therefore a run on debt is 
triggered, funds necessary to generate period 2 output (eventually generating funds for 
repayment) will be missing. An unfortunate resolution of illiquidity in period 1, 
destroying period 2 output, hence leads to self-fulfilling insolvency. Moreover, “lasting” 
insolvency and illiquidity are difficult to separate as an appropriate distinction requires 
the satisfactory valuation of the debtor. Yet applying market value to a sovereign fails in 
its very concept. These are reasons why the distinction between insolvency and 
illiquidity might not always be unequivocal. Nevertheless the conceptual distinction is 
an important one for policy.  
 
In this paper, reform proposals are discussed as solutions to insolvency, to cases 
where a write-down of debt makes economic sense. However, this does not mean that 
the proposed solutions, or elements of them, could not remedy a pure liquidity crisis. 
The case of pure illiquidity remains where the proper reaction consists of a 
postponement of payments in a payments standstill or capital injection (as the crisis 
                                                                                                                                         
problems. This was a  tremendously naïve argument, as it turned out to be. The international debt crisis 
of the 1980s was one of serious overindebtedness, illiquidity being just the tip of the iceberg. 
39 “In technical terms, the difference between the panics and inefficient workouts is that the former consists of multiple 
equilibria, one of which (the “run” equilibrium) is inefficient. The latter in turn involves a unique, although inefficient, 
equilibrium. In practical terms, one could note that the difference lies between a situation where a creditor collective action 
problem can cause a crisis, and one where it is an obstacle to its efficient resolution”. (Rogoff/Zettelmeyer (2002), p. 
28). Morris/Shin (1998) however argue that a single equilibrium suffices to explain both problems. 
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would be triggered by exogenous shocks). A proper analysis of it inevitably lead to the 
discussion on an International Lender of Last Resort (ILLR). This paper does not 
analyse an ILLR in detail, but it is a debate closely related to the one on sovereign 
bankruptcy procedures. As the distinction is an important one to understand, reference 
to some functions of an ILLR is made in the following chapter.  
 
3. The Theoretical Framework of Sovereign Bankruptcy    
 
This chapter provides an introduction into the economics of sovereign 
bankruptcy. It starts out by asking why bankruptcy law exists in the first place. 
Furthermore, what are the incentives of creditors and debtors respectively to engage in 
mutually advantageous debt contracts? What are the ex ante and ex post incentives of 
both parties to act in good faith? The rationale of bankruptcy is then transferred to the 
current inefficiencies in sovereign credit markets. The crucial question is to what extent 
the inefficiencies justify the creation of a bankruptcy procedure for sovereign debtors. 
In essence, this chapter is concerned with collective action problems of creditors as 
well as the debtor’s incentives to abide by contractual obligations and to avoid default. 
The international case further adds interesting elements, namely those of moral hazard 
and time consistency. In this paper, moral hazard is primarly concerned with current 
IMF policies that presumably drive creditors to make uneconomic loans and hold 
debtors from undertaking a serious policy-effort to repay outstanding debt.     
 
3.1. The Theoretical Rationale for a Bankruptcy Procedure 
 
Imagine a debtor and a creditor in a world with complete information, perfectly 
enforceable contracts and no transaction costs. The contracting parties could specify 
the contingencies of the debt contract for all possible states of the world and eventually 
enforce the provisions respectively according to the relevant outcome. In such a world, 
there would be no need for a bankruptcy procedure.  
 
However, the assumptions above are unrealistic. In the domestic corporate 
setting, a bankruptcy court provides binding arbitration for debtors and their creditors 
in the event of financial difficulties. The need for a bankruptcy court exists, as there are 
transaction costs involved in contracting and negotiations. Not all contingencies can be 
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accounted for in the contracts. Some parties may also be less informed than others. 
Usually debtors have better information on their project. Deciding on the final 
allocation of the debtor’s assets can take a long time and resources may be wasted while 
all information is processed. Faced with these inefficiencies, a bankruptcy procedure 
can be understood as a public good that is not provided by the market. 
 
An efficient corporate bankruptcy procedure accomplishes to balance two 
objectives: it minimizes the incentives of the debtor to resort to bankruptcy (ex ante) 
and maximizes the value of the firm after bankruptcy (ex post). The challenge 
bankruptcy law is confronted with, arises out of the trade-off between ex ante and ex 
post efficiency.40 An optimal bankruptcy procedure is also one that is “unemployed”. 
The crucial incentive of functional bankruptcy procedures is the mutual ex ante 
incentive of creditors and debtors alike, set to work before bankruptcy occurs. 
Commercial bankruptcy law affects far more cases than those that come to court 
because of the incentives it sets up for bargaining in the “shadow of the law”. The 
following attempts to evaluate how different these aspects are in the sovereign context. 
3.2. Framework of Sovereign Bankruptcy 
 
The same transaction costs and imperfect conditioning of contracts certainly 
exist in international lending where the prevalence of asymmetric information is 
evident. The sovereign debtor presumably has better information on his „project“, the 
country. It is harder for creditors to access certified and monitored sources of 
information on the financial health of the country. Time preferences of debtor country 
politicians may also be a source of uncertainty. It may for example be difficult to assess 
the government’s preferences with regard to possibly conflicting goals between the 
following elections and tough contractual obligations towards creditors. 
 
The rationale as such for the bankruptcy procedure in the sovereign context is 
largely undisputed. The problem in concept resembles the presented trade-offs in 
                                                 
40 A law that strongly penalizes the debtor upon bankruptcy may induce him to undertake considerable 
efforts to avoid bankruptcy (ex ante efficiency), but also carries the danger of having undermined firm 
value in a desperate attempt of the debtor to gamble for better times (ex post inefficiency). A law that 
provides a weak threat to the debtor and could lead to strategic non-payment (ex ante inefficiency) might 
in turn invoke the debtor to reveal information on financial distress early, and thus effectively preserve 
and restore firm value with timely creditor participation (ex post efficiency). 
  -17-
domestic bankruptcy law. The ex post objective of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure is 
to improve the income and growth prospects of the country. In concept, this could 
happen with largely the same procedures as a commercial reorganization. The necessary 
steps would include writing off debt, enforcing a restructuring agreement among all 
creditors and providing new funds for financial recovery. As one sets to improve the ex 
post efficiency of sovereign bankruptcy, the ex ante efficiency poses a significant 
challenge with sovereign debtors. The danger exists that a tough punishment could 
induce the sovereign to keep dragging obvious default further and gambling for better 
times. This is sure to undermine value for both parties and apart from that, serious 
negative externalities in the economy will be created. Harsh ex post conditions for the 
debtor, imposed by creditors, are not desirable as these are likely to hinder the 
sovereign from recovery. Nevertheless it is also important that the ex ante incentive for 
the debtor not to default are strong, particularly as the debtor is a sovereign state. In the 
question of international contract enforcement it is useless to be overly preoccupied 
with considerations of international law. If one defines international sovereign credit 
contracts as de facto non-binding in nature, there is no need for “legal illusions”. While 
in the domestic context legal enforcement of contracts is possible, “legal illusion” 
simply means that one should not rely on purely legal considerations in international 
contract enforcement.  
 
3.2.1. Inspirations from Domestic Bankruptcy Law – Chapter 11 
 
Reorganization 
 
Consider US bankruptcy law as an example for domestic bankruptcy. The U.S. 
Chapter 1141 can be considered to be a suitable example of a corporate bankruptcy code 
for outlining its conceptual transfer to sovereign case due to its position as model-law 
for many other bankruptcy codes worldwide.42 Chapter 11 tries to achieve two overall 
goals: to rehabilitate viable debtors and ensure equality of distribution among creditors. 
The two key benchmarks of the law are the liquidation and reorganization values of the 
                                                 
41 11 United States Code (USC) in Tarullo (2001). 
42 The normative risk one is confronted with by choosing the U.S. legislature for the analysis of the 
conceptual basis of corporate reorganisation is obviously the argument that other legal systems in the 
world are thus ignored. But this risk is effectively reduced for the simple reason that many, if not most, 
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firm. If the liquidation value is judged higher than the reorganization value, the firm will 
be liquidated and creditors maximise residual asset value among each other. The 
“reorganization value” is subject to a decision by the supermajority of creditors and the 
bankruptcy court. Agreement is to be reached where a proposed reorganization 
distributes the extra asset value fairly and equitably among creditors. Calculation of the 
alternative values in Chapter 11 is not a mechanical process but involves considerable 
discretion and an assessment of expected income streams. Nevertheless both directions 
in corporate bankruptcy are grounded in concepts of market value and provide a rule-
based offset for a bankruptcy system. The central difference of sovereign bankruptcy 
compared to the corporate case is that in the sovereign case reorganization is coercive. 
There is a public interest to maintain a country as a going-concern. For a sovereign, 
liquidation is not only unavailable in a technical sense, it is also inappropriate in a 
normative sense. The same applies also to domestic law regulating bankruptcies of 
private individuals, who can obviously neither be “liquidated”.43 
 
Control  
 
Under Chapter 11 proceedings, the management of a company always risks 
losing control regardless whether it chooses to declare bankruptcy or lets creditors 
force it to do so upon default. A co-operative management can be granted the 
possibility to remain in charge with a general permission to conduct the business. The 
conceptual transfer to the sovereign context for the “debtor-in-possession” provision 
fails. The comparable tool of displacing an incumbent government is both 
inappropriate and impossible. Abstracting from the possibility of military intervention, 
a government cannot be forced to resign by foreign creditors.44 To what extent the 
present system of IMF-conditionality in lending resembles outside control on a 
sovereigns domestic issues is an interesting question, yet will not be elaborated on  
here.45  
 
                                                                                                                                         
other countries’ laws are actually based on Chapter 11, or on principles very similar to those in Chapter 
11. See Schwarcz (2000), p. 119.  
43 Private individuals insolvency law, e.g. US Chapter 13 and German §§ 17, 18 InsO.  
44 Although this used to be different in earlier times. Britain, France and Spain intervened in Mexico 
during 1859-61 on behalf of the creditors. The finances of Egypt (then under the Ottoman Empire) were 
taken over by British and French functionaries. US Marines took over control of the Dominican 
Republic’s customs revenues in 1905 and Nicaraguas in 1911. (Obstfeld/Rogoff 1996, p. 352). 
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3.2.2. Creditor Incentives 
 
The creditor base of a (middle-income) sovereign debtor is broad and 
anonymous. In the following creditor ex ante and ex post incentives  are measured 
against the yardstick of Chapter 11. The main elements of Chapter 11 are a payments 
standstill, the debtor-in-possession (DIP management & finance) provisions and 
supermajority voting to successfully restructure the debt (and restrain creditors 
unwilling to abide by the terms). The problems discussed below are problems of 
collective action. They can all effectively hinder individual creditors to act in a 
collectively utility-maximizing manner.  
 
Stopping A Grab Race  
 
A grab race on debt is the classic ex ante collective action problem. Consider an 
analogy to the prisoners dilemma in the classic Diamond/Dybvig (1983) model on 
bank-runs. In the event of bad news and looming default, every creditor has the 
incentive to assure full repayment of debt. As the assets of the debtor are less liquid 
than its liabilities and they are perceived to be insufficient to repay all outstanding debt 
at present. This is why every creditor has an incentive to race in order to have any 
chance to be repaid in full.46 Due to sequential servicing, the debtor would not be able 
to honor the credit last in line and therefore creditors withdraw capital. On one hand, 
sovereign debt is formally not subject to the same sequential servicing as bank deposits 
in Diamond/Dybvig. However, it has been argued that sovereign debt generates a 
similar possibility for contract design to cause a “country run” that could make 
everyone worse off. As a debt crisis is unfolding, creditors “rush to the exits” and 
worsen the painful default and the disorder that could have been avoided.  
 
A “payments standstill” under Chapter 11 is implemented to provide the debtor 
protection from claims of creditors for a limited period. In the sovereign context, this 
will happen in the form of a unilateral suspension of debt of the state, but in the 
sovereign case a broader scope with capital outflow controls might become necessary. 
                                                                                                                                         
45 See Cornelli/Felli (1995), p. 75 
46 A run leads to the abandonment of investment, profitable and unprofitable. The socially optimal 
outcome of all creditors rolling over is not going to materialize because the individual dominant strategies 
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The biggest benefit of a standstill is that it impedes the assets from running out of the 
country due to panic. It cancels the payment of interest and principal during the 
standstill. Under the status quo, the debtor can, in principle, institute this standstill 
unilaterally. For reasons to be explained, a sovereign debtor is usually reluctant to do so 
unless the situation becomes extraordinarily unsustainable. 
 
The dangers of an officially sanctionded standstill in the international context is 
also worth mentioning. The application of a standstill in the absence of credible 
„ground rules“ on its use could generate significant litigation on issues such as when it 
should apply, for how long and what exceptions should be allowed. If a standstill is an 
option but the ground rules are not clear enough, creditors could rush for the exits at 
the weakest signs of problems in the anticipation of the automatic suspension of 
payments and a possible bankruptcy procedure. In this manner, the option of a 
standstill could carry a self-fulfilling trigger and worsen the ex ante collective action 
problem of creditors.  
 
The management of collective action determines not only the consequences of 
creditor behaviour before the crisis, but also ex post during restructuring efforts. In 
addition to the halt on payments, a standstill could also comprise a legal stay. A legal 
stay can be imposed to protect the debtor from litigation by its creditors during the 
period of reorganization. Suppose a debtor defaults and imposes a unilateral standstill 
on repayment. Given unilateral debt suspension in the absence of a simultaneous 
officially sanctioned legal stay on litigation, what can result is massive creditor litigation, 
a creditor “rush to the courthouse”. The problem may be worsened if individual claims 
are bought up by a “vulture fund” (the likes of Elliott Associates) which then uses the 
total aggregated value to push for repayment with enhanced force. 
 
Debt Restructuring & Restraining Holdouts  
 
After the debtor has defaulted and is renegotiating the debt, a possible free-rider 
externality exists. The reason why any creditor would voluntarily write-down debt is 
that he expects to raise the probability of recovery if the nominal value of claims is 
                                                                                                                                         
of the creditors make them choose to withdraw. With this sort of a run, both creditors and the debtor 
end up loosing and the outcome turns Pareto-inferior. 
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reduced. But in the absence of coercive provisions it may be impossible to reach an 
agreement when there are many creditors. Once restructuring efforts have started and 
the debtor is looking to reach an agreement with a majority of the creditors, some 
minority creditors might not consent to the terms. These creditors lie low until 
agreement has been reached only to reappear later to claim better terms. Thus they 
benefit from other creditors restructuring their debt without sharing the cost. The 
probability of recovery will be increased for creditors who “holdout” and stick to their 
initial contract. Theoretically, in equilibrium no creditor will agree to a voluntary debt 
write-down if they can hope to take a free ride on the agreement of others. This 
collective action problem clearly exists for bondholders. The trend from bank loans to 
bonds in the 90s has worsened the holdout problem. The creditor base widened and 
inter-creditor communication became harder.47  
 
As long as unanimity is required to reach a decision, the incentive to holdout 
remains. While the pure unanimity problem can be (and has been) solved with 
exchange offers by the sovereign debtor, the holdout problem still prevails. In this 
regard, having a restructuring plan that, once approved by the majority of creditors, 
binds all creditors solves this holdout externality. Majority voting makes a decision by a 
qualified majority of creditors binding on potential holdouts not accepting the agreed 
settlement. In Chapter 11, this is provided as “supermajority voting”. A “cramdown” 
provision in Chapter 11 permits the bankruptcy court to impose a reorganization 
against the opposition of one or more uncooperative creditor classes. Cramdown is an 
important feature for a debtor faced with many creditor classes. A US-style exit consent 
in bond contracts could also solve the holdout problem as far as the new bond terms 
make the old bonds unattractive (without changing the payment terms).48  
 
New  Priority Finance  
 
Providing finance to the debtor as well as preferred creditor status to creditors 
financing reorganization are crucial aspects of any working bankruptcy law. In Chapter 
11, creditors who extend credit to the company „in the ordinary course of business“49 
                                                 
47 The basic problem, however, may also affect other types of debt. Banks for example may be reluctant 
to restructure syndicated loans if the debtor did not manage to restructure bonds. 
48 This way holdouts would be voluntarily drawn to endorse the new bonds.  
49 11 United States Code (USC), §364(a) (1994) in Tarullo (2001). 
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are also granted a first priority (“administrative expense”) claim. For creditors extending 
credit outside the ordinary course of business, e.g. new investment, the court guarantees 
„superpriority“ on their claims. Fresh borrowing is permitted when it enhances the 
debtor’s prospects for recovery and is likely to increase market value of the firm.  
 
Upon default and the following the lack of liquidity, countries also need to 
attract money to fulfill general obligations. There is a strong case to ask existing 
creditors to provide this fresh money (Krugman 1988). The situation is similar to the 
holdout problem. Assume there is a threshold amount of money needed to restore debt 
sustainability in the country. Only if an investor believes this threshold amount will be 
provided by the creditors including himself, he will participate. The promise to provide 
official finance will lower the threshold amount and the collective action problem may 
be less severe. (If official finance is relatively small compared to the absolute size of the 
package, this effect will not be very big). New money has a positive externality on the 
debt burden as long if it contributes to growth and a fresh start of the debtor. Priority 
finance following default is a crucial aspect in working bankruptcy mechanisms. If a 
fresh start is not appropriately ensured and does not carry the hope to increase value, 
the purpose of creditor concessions during restructuring is defeated. 
 
3.2.3. Debtor Incentives  
 
Commitment and Signalling 
 
A sovereign state is formally neither subject to international nor foreign 
domestic law and it enjoys immunity abroad with regard to its political representation 
and functions. However, concerning the commercial activity of the sovereign, this 
immunity is often waived. The sovereign thus agrees to make commercial claims against 
it “enforceable” in foreign courts. The Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act (FSIA) in the 
US and the State Immunity Act in the UK in fact could be seen as legal enforcement 
technologies in creditor’s hands. In this connection it becomes questionable how far 
“legal illusion” (as defined above) is still valid. Two scenarios are possible. First, the 
theory of “legal illusion” is still fully valid and the voluntary waiving of immunity by 
borrowing sovereigns is a signal of co-operativeness, but effectively nothing but 
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“friendly phrases”. Or second, immunity waiving actually grants the creditors effective 
legal means against the debtor. The case of Elliott Associates vs. Peru suggests that the 
latter holds true. An American court granted the creditor an attachment order for 
Peruvian assets.50 Peru eventually settled and payed a high price ($56 million settlement 
vs. $20 worth of claims). By subjecting itself to a foreign jurisdiction, the debtor 
signalises his utmost willingness to undergo all efforts to repay. From the perspective of 
the debtor, the immunity waivers are therefore an effective “commitment vehicle” (Bulow 
2002) for being able to borrow in the first place. In this environment, defaults can 
hardly be strategic (lack of willingness), but mostly due to a „true“ non-ability-to-pay. 
 
Concerning commitment and signalling, a similar argument can be elaborated 
taking foreign issued bonds and examining them with regard to the governing law 
under which they are issued. According to the Eichengreen/Mody (2000) calculations, 
44% of (foreign issued) sovereign bonds are issued under UK law, and 32% under US 
law. As the UK provides the debtor with majority action protection with Collective 
Action Clauses (CACs) in the event of default, the question rises why not all bonds of 
all sovereigns are issued in London? In effect, debtors are in a state of selling bonds, 
not preparing for future restructurings. It is clear that no debtor would like to be 
assessed to be in the situation of prospective default. CACs, from the point of view of 
the issuer, are regarded to be „extraordinarily useful at the end, but distinctly unromantic in the 
beginning“.51 The (un)romance obviously prevails: some brave sovereign borrowers have 
even gone as far as to delete the protections offered by US bond contracts (e.g. exit 
consents) as a visible demonstration of their commitment. As debtors want to credibly 
precommit to repay and demonstrate absolute willingness to pay, they choose the US.  
 
Sovereign Collateral  
 
In order to credibly commit to a cooperative behaviour a sovereign can consent 
to waive its immunity or expel other protections on offer. Furthermore, this can be 
particularly necessary as obligations of the state in the form of bonds lack explicit 
                                                 
50 In a situation of attachment order, the sovereign’s funds and mobile assets (monetary or real) can be 
attached by creditors. An international investor is quoted of having threatened to “capture every Aeroflot 
that lands abroad” following the Russian governments (1998) announcement to cease payment to bond-
holders. 
51 See Buchheit/Gulati 2002, p. 34. 
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collateral.52 In the absence of credible coercion, nothing formally impedes the debtor to 
repudiate the debt. Therefore if commitment and signalling set ex ante incentives, 
concrete ex post costs have to exist that make the sovereign pay.  
 
In the 1980s academics devoted considerable attention to why sovereigns repay 
in the first place. Some papers came up with reasons why unilateral default bears a 
number of indirect non-default incentives. The argument in one of the classic papers 
on the issue of sovereign debt repudiation, Eaton/Gersowitz (1981), was that an 
important incentive for a sovereign is the threat of reputation loss. What results from 
unilateral default is a threatening banishment from international financial markets.53 
The debt is payed because the debtor hopes to be able to borrow in the future as well.54 
Considering the effects of bankruptcy protection in the Eaton/Gersowitz-world (where 
only reputation matters), an orderly procedure shapes incentives only as far as the 
debtor hopes to improve reputation by consenting to a fair and transparent 
procedure.55 The pure reputational view was questioned by Bulow/Rogoff (1989), who 
claimed that the threat to a sovereign from repudiation has to be broader than just its 
image in credit markets. In their framework they show that the critical aspect to hinder 
the sovereign from non-payment is the threat of banishment from markets as both 
future lender and future borrower. For Bulow/Rogoff, the Eaton/Gersovitz model 
fails to explain borrowing if the country can still invest (and is only excluded from 
future borrowing). To suffer any harm from non-payment, the opposite scenario in 
which the sovereign gets to enforce international loans should not be allowed to 
emerge.  
 
Moreover, some developing country government debt contracts contain explicit 
waivers that make it more difficult for sovereigns that repudiate their debt to engage in 
                                                 
52 Other forms of obligations, e.g. bank debt, are only rarely collateralized with the property of the debtor 
In some exceptions loans of developing countries tend to be collateralized with mobile assets of the 
sovereign, e.g. an aeroplane of the state-owned airline (Ethiopia in the 70s). 
53 In their framework, a country seeks smoothing of consumption given risky and volatile income, and 
that is why it enters international credit markets. Repayment is thus secured up to a certain point. The 
critical amount is set to where debt does not serve the purpose of smoothing anymore. At this point the 
country will default. The repayment incentives decrease as the amount of debt increases.  
54 This is in fact very similar to the bankruptcy of an individual (US Chapter 13). The only pecuniary 
incentive for an individual not to default is his hopes to be able to receive credit in the future  
(abstracting from non-pecuniary incentives such as imprisonment). 
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international trade. The existence of these waivers supports the assumption that 
creditors can impose direct sanctions on a sovereign debtor affecting output.56 Creditors 
can disrupt the intra- and inter-temporal trade of an uncooperative sovereign debtor by 
forcing it toward autarky. Given the pervasive use of credit in international trade, intra-
temporal trade could be reduced to barter. The threat is likely to be clearer for a small 
debtor nation with limited international trade powers. When a debtor has remarkable 
power on international markets, its negotiation position is stronger because the threats 
of trade losses are mutual. A debtor with high participation quotas in international trade 
can effectively threaten to obstruct the flow of goods and services (Klimenko 2000). 
Through a set of financial and trade impediments, creditors can threaten to prevent the 
debtor to gain from output (Dooley 2000). The sanctions suffered by defaulting 
debtors are a general loss of the country’s reputation in credit markets as well as output 
costs that may be severe. For all these reasons, the present system can be described as 
one that involves a remarkable incentive to avoid default. 
  
Uncertainty and Delays  
 
At present, the ex ante incentive for countries not to default is strong. This 
worsens the ex post hardship of restructuring. Experience suggests that countries will 
gamble for redemption and follow every potential glimpse of hope before defaulting 
and attempting to initiate negotiation efforts. The looming uncertainty concerning the 
messy consequences of having to deal with a broad range of creditors and immense 
externalities of default in the economy are threat enough to drag a de facto certain 
default to the extreme. Cline (2002) attempts to formalize the working of this gamble.57 
On the other side, delays on the side of the creditors often have to do with determining 
the true state of the debtor. It is costly and time-consuming to verify the state, both 
                                                                                                                                         
55 On the other hand, a new procedure could enable countries to default without loosing their reputation 
Yet especially if one carries no international “legal illusions”, and commitment is decisive, the second 
scenario could be seen as one that would lead to more strategic defaults (and/or less capital flows). 
56 See also Obstfeld/Rogoff 1996, p. 353. 
57 Cline (2002) proposes a kind of “pre-emptive default”, which is thought to be less damaging for the 
country because it is adopted early. However, he also explains why a pre-emptive default is most likely 
not going to be initiated. The key point is that even if the damage of waiting for a forced default is 
greater than defaulting preemptively, the threshold between the two damages (default in period t or t+1) 
has to be big enough before a government chooses not to hold out for better times and/or gamble for 
redemption. Even assuming that an objective probability-weighed relative loss of default in period t+1 
can be defined, it requires a relatively large increment in the damage from waiting as opposed to 
defaulting in the first period for doing so. Underlining this difficulty is the fact that the relative severity of 
forced default (t+1) in comparison to the voluntary one (t) has not been empirically proven. 
  -26-
with regard to the motivation of default (whether the default was strategic or just “bad 
luck”) as well as with regard to the appropriate remedy (whether the debtor is insolvent 
or illiquid).  
 
3.2.4. Sovereign Risk - Implications for the Cost of Debt 
 
Implications of the Probability of Default  
 
With imperfect information and any positive probability of default, the interest 
rate of borrowing will exceed the risk-free rate. The higher the anticipated probability 
of default, the higher will be the cost of capital borne by the debtor. As a result of the 
messy consequences of sovereign default, sovereign risk augments overall risk beyond 
commercial risk. The perception of the risk of default is the most common and suitable 
measure to assess risk. It is the spread between risky and risk-free debt that measures 
the expected value of losses due to default. The spread between thirty-year US 
government bonds, considered risk-free, and emerging market bonds averaged 261 
basis points in the 1990s. As the medium-risk U.S. corporations spread averages at 139 
basis points over the decade, this value is about 88%-points higher than the interest 
spread on US corporate bonds during the same period. On the other hand, sovereign 
debt payoff rates following default are similar to those for companies in Chapter 11. US 
corporate reorganisations averaged quite similar as the average secondary market price 
for 15 highly indebted countries, at 53 cents on the dollar.58 Giving faith to this finding, 
one could conclude that differences lie solely in the anticipated probability of default, 
since the recovery rates conditional on default have been observed to be similar. Bulow 
(2002) states laconically that it is thus “crazy to buy or sell [the emerging markt bonds] without 
realising they are very likely to be restructured”.59 
 
Possible Cost Effects of A Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedure 
 
The access to and the cost of capital add important elements to the debtor’s ex 
ante incentives to undertake all efforts not to default. As becomes evident from the 
data above, an emerging market debtor already faces a considerable interest burden. If 
bankruptcy procedures make restructuring easier, it could contribute to ex ante 
                                                 
58 See White (2002), p. 14-15. 
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inefficiency if the debtor is less careful to avoid default. On the other hand, a 
transparent procedure could also provide more ex post certainty and make restructuring 
more orderly. The issue eventually comes down to the question which effect is 
dominating. 
 
A way to analyze the effect of debtor protection from market forces is to look 
at existing procedures where both features, protection and “no protection”, exist 
simultaneously. Recall the case of CACs under UK law, as opposed to US law where 
unanimity is required. At this point it is instructive to examine the effect of the 
governing law on bond prices. One could expect that it is not favourable for the price 
of bonds if legal means existed to make restructuring easier. Eichengreen/Mody (2000) 
measure bond spreads with primary market data60 for a number of sovereigns. They 
take into account that borrowers more likely to default could choose UK law. This 
assumption, ceteris paribus, would imply higher interest rates in London. Interestingly 
enough, there seems to be a difference in borrowing costs with regard to the country’s 
credit ratings. Whereas debtors with low credit ratings pay more in London than in 
New York, debtors with a high rating actually raise cheaper capital in London. This 
suggests that lower ratings need the disciplining effect of US terms. Eichengreen/Mody 
(2000) suggest that CACs can reduce spreads with 50 basis points for borrowers with 
high ratings. The evidence is statistically significant, yet it is limited and not 
unequivocally confirmed by other studies using different methods.61 According to this 
limited evidence, there could be a case for quality selection. 
  
An efficient bankruptcy procedure provides the debtor with the incentive to 
maximize the profits of the projects but it also provides creditors with the incentive to 
lend at a reasonable rate. If in exchange for the present occasional ad hoc restructurings 
                                                                                                                                         
59 See Bulow (2002), p. 5. 
60 The governing law under which the bond is issued can be used as a proxy for the existence of CAC in 
a bond contract. The spread of a bond is regressed on this proxy and several other variables expected to 
explain the spread. Data for bond spreads can be generated in two ways: Primary market data: one may use 
the interest on the day of issuance for each bond in the sample, or alternatively: Secondary market data: one 
may calculate the interest rate at a certain point in time by using the actual bond price and the stream of 
future payments. 
61 The impact on spreads is calculated as an average for each category. Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen 
(1999) use secondary market data to estimate the impact of the governing law on bond spreads. They 
argue that the variation of bond spreads over time is larger than any variation that could be associated to 
the use of different governing laws. Presumably some endogenity expected in the process of the initial 
offering diminishes over the time the bond is traded. 
  -28-
the infrequent and disastrous crises became less severe, more frequent defaults could in 
principle even be efficiency enhancing. If the higher likelihood of restructuring drives 
the cost upwards, why should the possibly reduced losses of creditors not exert 
downward pressure on capital costs? Indeed, this could be one way of taking the 
Eichengreen/Mody (2000) results along when rethinking sovereign bankruptcy. If 
creditors have greater certainty about credible and transparent „ground rules“, it should 
assist them in internalising risk. Countries would also have an incentive to follow sound 
economic policies as these would then be rewarded with lower cost of credit. It has 
often been argued that the quantity effect of market protection would also be severe, 
i.e. the capital flows would decline drastically. However this argument seems flawed. If 
anything has drained capital flows to emerging markets it is the crises in the second half 
of the 90s.62 Moreover, it should be noted that capital inflows are not a virtue in their 
own right. Even higher costs of capital and lower volumes in flows are not per se 
welfare decreasing. A crucial momentum lies in the stability of these flows. More ample 
and more stable capital flows are not unlikely to have an overall welfare-improving 
effect. 
3.3. IMF Policies   
 
The international nature of the sovereign bankruptcy problem requires the 
study of a final important element, namely that of multilateral finance. The 
understanding of the implications of multilateral lending on ex ante incentives of the 
creditors and debtor alike are crucial for the design of a functional sovereign 
bankruptcy procedure. Although multilateral finance and its current features directly 
have not much to do with a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, the analysis is important 
with regard to the incentives these policies can create. In this paper, the „multilateral“ is 
simplified to be only the International Monetary Fund. The following examines 
problems created by IMF policies.  
  
3.3.1. Moral Hazard and Time Consistency  
 
The inefficiency often linked to IMF policies is that of moral hazard. Moral 
hazard describes the undesired effect of an insurance, where the insured agents 
                                                 
62 The capital flows are declining since 1997, see White (2002), p. 17 
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incentives to prevent the insured event are reduced. When the IMF regularly provides 
rescue loans (bailouts) in different countries in the event of crises, international 
investors develop expectations anticipating the next intervention. In this constellation 
of implicit rescue promises risk is not appropriately assessed (creditor moral hazard) 
and good economic policies are not followed (debtor moral hazard). Barro (1998) 
suggests that bailouts increase the probability of sovereign default through moral 
hazard on both debtors and creditors side. With reference to the $42 billion bailout 
package for Brazil (1998), Barro asks how Brazil qualified for this support and 
concludes that “[t]hey did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies”.63 For Barro, Brazil 
would not have qualified for IMF support with better policies. After discussing the 
bailouts for Mexico in 1995 and Russia in 1998 he suggests that the IMF changed its 
name to IMH – Institute of Moral Hazard.64   
 
Condeming moral hazard is a complicated task once expectations of 
interventions have been shaped. Under the present system the IMF (and other official 
lenders) are stuck in a “time consistency trap”.65 To illustrate, consider an emerging 
market economy with systemic importance (e.g. Argentina, Russia, Turkey). Ex ante, 
the optimal policy for the IMF at present is to announce limited lending in hopes of 
dampening the excessively risky lending and borrowing. However, when liquidity is 
short and a capital account crisis hits one of these countries, the IMF faces the 
unpleasant policy choice to either leave the country subjected to highly disorganised 
creditor-runs and an uncertain fate by doing nothing, or providing a large bailout. The 
optimal policy for the IMF will then be to provide the necessary bailout, no matter what 
was announced earlier. (See Annex 6.1 for an illustration of the game theory behind this time-
consistency problem). 
 
3.3.2. The IMF - A Lender of Last Resort? 
 
In a domestic context, the central bank has the task to provide liquidity to 
neutralize shortfalls and to stem financial panic. This function generallty abides by the 
                                                 
63 Barro (1998), p. 18. 
64 The original sin is often said to having been committed in Mexico as the approx. 600 basis point 
spread on Mexican bonds, the „tesobonos“, did not matter at all. The tesobonos were effectively risk free 
following the large bailout of creditors by the IMF and the US treasury. 
65 To borrow the Kydland/Prescott (1979) terminology. 
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Bagehot (1873) principles of liquidity provision in temporary crisis that makes funds 
available freely at penalty rates. On the international level, the IMF today has been said 
to perform some of the functions of a lender of last resort (IFIAC 2000). Yet the IMF 
lacks powers of an international central bank. That is why it is often referred to as a 
“quasi-lender of last resort” (Fischer 1999). The qualifier “quasi” is meant to distinguish 
the IMF from a “true” Bagehot-like lender of last resort. The IMF provides conditional 
liquidity in crisis, yet lacks crucial competences of a central bank. It is equipped with the 
mere tools of a financial intermediary. (See Annex 6.2. for important differences between the 
Bagehot LLR and the IMF).  
 
Consider the IMF lending to a country with debt servicing problems. In theory, 
capital injection (i.e. provision of support) only makes sense if the underlying problem 
is identified as illiquidity and other adverse effects of liquidity provision do not occur. 
As IMF bailouts should serve solely to fight off temporary illiquidity, there are two 
types of errors that the IMF is confronted with (Cline 2002). The first type of error 
would be the provision of support when it turns out there is insolvency. The second 
would be failing to provide support when the country could have been solvent. These 
errors underline the dilemma of the IMF. It has been claimed that IMF lending policies 
have lost their guiding principles, let alone they ever had any credible ones. In practice, 
the attempt has not been made to define which circumstances require capital at punitive 
rates, which at non-punitive rates and in which capital should be entirely withheld for 
reasons of insolvency.  
 
3.3.3. Rules vs. Discretion  
 
To overcome problems of time inconsistency (and thus also those of moral 
hazard), the Meltzer Commission (IFIAC 2000)66 advocated clear rules rather than 
discretion for IMF assistance in the form of strict pre-qualification criteria limiting 
access to assistance. In case these criteria are not met, the IMF should refuse to lend. 
Suppose clearly set out rules and pre-qualification criteria for IMF financial help. 
Suppose further, that a country with systemic importance did not fulfil these criteria for 
IMF assistance, and therefore did not receive help. The ex post consequences for global 
                                                 
66 As well as some other authors, e.g. Calomiris (1998). 
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financial stability of an insistence that ex ante rules be upheld can be devastating. The 
risk that sovereign default will cause severe economic, financial and political 
dislocations is great. There is also some risk that it will have destabilizing repercussions 
affecting the stability of the international financial system. Market participants act on 
the rational expectation that the IMF stands by, and any policy statement denying 
assistance will have no credibility in the eyes of decisive market players. An effective ex 
ante rule would have to completely ensure that the ex post scenario never emerges. An 
IMF commitment not to bailout would not be credible.  
 
One suggested solution to this time inconsistency problem would be some form 
of creditor participation in the costs of a crisis, also referred to as a bail-in. Faced with 
the prospect of having to write down debt, creditors would be expected to extend 
credit lines and withhold from “running”. A possible solution is the strategy of 
“constructive ambiguity” in IMF action. According to this concept, the IMF would 
provide help in some cases, but not always. It is designed to randomise bailouts and 
thus keep the threat of no intervention alive. The idea is that the lively risk of not being 
bailed out gives creditors the incentive not to grab but to accept a write-down in debt.  
Yet this argument has critical pitfalls in practice. It is questionable whether a 
randomised treatment does not violate the equal treatment rule of IMF members. 
Closely related, random treatment is not credible as some countries have systemic 
importance (Argentina, Russia, Turkey), and others do not (Ecuador, Romania, 
Pakistan). It is no surprise that the latter group of “too-big-to-fail” countries were the 
ones bailed out in recent history, and the former were left to (more or less) successful 
private sector restructuring schemes. Hence constructive ambiguity has been attempted 
already, but neither have the policies been constructive nor ambiguous, but very 
predictable in the course of events. The strategy of constructive ambiguity has lacked 
any consistence in rules. But as rules are not credible, their implementation would be a 
high-risk undertaking for the IMF.67  
 
Moral hazard is hard to measure and test. Basically, its existence implies that an 
insured investor treats a project as being less risky than fundamentals would suggest. 
The effect on borrowing costs would intuitively be lowering, i.e. moral hazard presents 
                                                 
67 See Tarullo (2001) for a detailled discussion on rules vs. discretion in the international financial system. 
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a “multilateral subsidy”. There is no model determining bond spreads accurately 
enough so that moral hazard can be observed by simply taking a look at bond spreads. 
A natural experiment would be needed where one can claim that in one situation moral 
hazard exists, but not in the other. However, the issue will not be elaborated at this 
point.68 The link between moral hazard and sovereign debt crises is therefore still a 
tenuous policy basis. Nevertheless the time inconsistency of IMF policies is largely 
undisputed. Many observers believe that the current system of discretionary 
intervention displays too much of a pattern when issuing rescue loans. Repeated 
rescues weaken market discipline. The forced repetition of rescues allows for financial 
vulnerablities to build up, effectively worsening the fallout at the time of economic and 
financial collapse. In any case, the present system of anticipated bailouts could not exist 
in tandem with a new sovereign bankruptcy procedure as the former runs the risk of 
defeating the purpose of the latter. 
 
4. Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposals 
 
Having looked at the history of sovereign debt problems as well as special 
problems in sovereign credit markets in considerable detail, it is finally appropriate to 
evaluate proposals for reformed bankruptcy procedures. Although the main focus of 
this paper is on more recent contributions trying to address problems brought on by 
financial integration and liberalization as well as the emergence of bond finance (moral 
hazard & self-fulfilling runs), a few earlier solutions are also presented. The earlier 
proposals were motivated by the 80s debt crisis and and are mainly concerned with 
messy and protracted debt workouts of developing countries. 
 
4.1. Proposals During the Deb  Crisis t
                                                
 
As a reaction to the disastrous debt crises of the 1980s, market-based schemes 
for debt reduction were introduced. In these schemes, the country itself took the 
initiative in reducing the debt stock by buying back debt at discounted prices (Bolivia, 
Brazil), swapping bank loans for local currency that had to be invested domestically 
 
68 Interested readers can refer to Lane/Phillips (2000) and Dell’Arricia, Schnabel and Zettelmeyer (2000). 
for more sophisticated empirical studies. 
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(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico), or exchanging loans for “exit bonds” that carried 
lower principal or interest (Mexico, Argentina).69 They did not prove to be succesful as 
their voluntary nature impeded sufficient debt reduction. Soon the schemes were 
complemented with the Brady-bonds subsidized by the official sector. The Brady 
initiative has been said to having been the first procedure for sovereigns carrying 
certain features of domestic bankruptcy procedures, mainly because it was officially 
sanctioned and subsidized. The Brady bonds provided a number of countries with a 
new form of bonded finance, but also failed to provide solutions in at least one single 
case (Ecuador 1999).70  
 
While the 80s were productive in developing market-based schemes that 
eventually culminated in the Brady plan, other proposals were more concerned with the 
official sector’s policies. They attempted to improve the official multilateral approach to 
sovereign debt problems. One proposal called to use the existing IMF Articles of 
Agreement71 Article VIII, Section 2 with a more authoritative interpretation in order to 
provide legal protection for debtor countries in serious debt service difficulties. This 
section reads: 
 
“Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3 (b) and Article XIV, Section 
2, no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on 
the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. 
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are 
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or 
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the 
territories of any member.” 
 
The idea to make use of the Articles came from Debevoise (1984). In his 
proposal a country with an unsustainable debt burden would apply for an IMF-
endorsed “deferral mechanism” accepted by the IMFs Executive Board. This 
mechanism would provide a debtor country declaring a unilateral payments standstill 
with extended legal immunity. He argued that endeavours to halt uncoordinated 
creditor enforcement against debtor countries had been unsuccessful because courts in 
the creditor countries did not regard the term “exchange contracts” as broad enough to 
cover loan agreements. For the case that the IMF endorsement of the mechanism was 
                                                 
69 See Cline (1995), p. 212-15.   
70 See e.g. Raffer (2000), p. 3  
71 To be called “Articles” hereafter. 
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not enough, domestic legislation might have to be amended. Soon later the IMF 
actually called for an authoritative interpretation of Section 2 to achieve more uniformity 
in the interpretation of the Articles, yet never with the purpose of granting debtor 
countries officially sanctioned payment standstills. 
 
The International Debt Restructuring Agency 
 
Towards the end of the 80s some proposals envisaged a new international 
organization to deal with sovereign debt problems. In one of them, Benjamin Cohen 
(1989) called for a US Chapter 11 based “International Debt Restructuring Agency” 
(IDRA). The IDRA would be a new, independent and neutral multilateral convention. 
In order to make the creation feasible, it should be a “joint venture” between the Fund 
and the World Bank. The role of the IDRA would be that of a monitor, mediator and 
facilitator in sovereign debt problems. Cohen is mainly concerned with creditor free-
ride incentives as well as the underprovision of new financing, central aspects in the US 
Chapter 11. The IDRA would also have the powers to force dissenting creditors to 
abide by the majority vote in case of restructuring agreements. It could do so as soon as 
it has declared the proposed solution to be “fair and equitable”. The IDRA could force 
creditors to give concessions to the debtor if relief is considered justified by all parties. 
Adherence to the agreed terms would be supervised by the IDRA. Debtor good 
behaviour is defined as „not seeking more reduction in debt than is deemed necessary to allow for a 
fresh start“.72 The debtor is obliged to re-expose itself to the creditor grab race if 
equitable agreement is being blocked by it. Thus the IDRA could allow creditors to 
withdraw concessions if the debtor is not acting in good faith. In general, the IDRA is a 
good example for an early proposal where a new organization with significant powers is 
created. 
 
Objective Criteria For Bankruptcy 
 
In order to tackle the problem of measurement of debt sustainability, a (then) 
Swiss treasury official Daniel Kaeser (1990) proposed clear criteria for a sovereign debt 
workout mechanism. Kaeser wished to solve three problems at once: 1. Create a 
mechanism for debt reduction, 2. Discourage future indebtedness and 3. Provide 
countries with sustainable debt burdens to access capital markets at relatively low cost. 
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Instead of applying bankruptcy procedures to any country experiencing payment 
problems, the debt service would be measured against export revenues. A centralized 
registry would be put in motion constantly controlling the indebtedness of countries. 
As the debt-export ratio exceeds a certain threshold, e.g. 25%, a sovereign would be 
allowed to petition the mechanism.73 Below the threshold no petition would be allowed. 
Debt relief would be granted conditional upon necessary fiscal adjustment policies 
monitored by the IMF. In tandem with having objective criteria for bankruptcy 
initiation, Kaeser wished to shape incentives for countries to remain below the 
threshold. He proposed an insurance fund that guarantees the payment of interest by 
countries, accessible to countries with sustainable debt burdens. This way these 
countries could be able to attract cheaper capital. It would also serve as an incentive for 
sustainable debt management keeping the debt burden under the threshold. Countries 
with higher burdens would seek assistance of the bankruptcy mechanism. As a debt 
restructuring should result in sufficient write-down, the country would find itself below 
the threshold after the procedure, thus being able to attract new finance. In this way the 
Kaeser proposal also implicitly addresses the underprovision of new finance problem in 
bankruptcy.  
 
The Kaeser-proposal is a unique because it almost exclusively stresses debtor 
incentives and abstracts from externalities in creditor behaviour. It provides the 
concept of an elegant, self-executing and largely market-based solution. However, the 
proposal may be inapplicable for one crucial reason. The central criterium is the debt-
export ratio. As discussed in the second chapter, this poses an undeniable measurement 
problem and in addition could carry fundamental flaws in validity. The debt-export 
ratio, although useful for the analytical case, is not applicable in practice to measure true 
debt sustainability. Consequently the Kaeser proposal, although innovative in nature, is 
likely to leave too much room for uncertainty. 
                                                                                                                                         
72 See Cohen (1989), p. 126 
73 The workout mechanism could function under the auspices of the IMF or another international 
agency. 
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4.2. Recent Proposals 
 
The following proposals have all been presented after the Mexican tequila crisis 
in 1994/5. They are mainly divided into statutory and contractual proposals. Statutory 
proposals are referred to as proposals that require changes in statutes. They are to be 
understood as changes in law, either national or international. Internationally, this can 
either be an amendment to existing international treaties or consist of a creation of new 
international treaties and/or bodies. On the national level it would mean a change in 
national law.74 The range of the statutory definition this paper adopts is large. It reaches 
from international tribunals to relatively small amendments in domestic legislation. In 
essence, every modification in law is considered to be a statutory change. The second 
class of proposals do not seek to create treaties or modify law. These proposals 
envision limited changes in financial contracts. As they wish to modify contracts, these 
proposals have been often referred to as „Contractual Approaches“. After having 
examined the statutory and contractual cases, it might be of interest to look into a 
proposal that does not really fit in neither class, but attempts to use some ILLR-
functions for situations of unsustainable debt.  
4.3. Statutory Proposals 
 
4.3.1. Jeffrey Sachs (1995) 
 
Shortly after the Mexican tequila crisis in 1994/5, Jeffrey Sachs held an 
influential lecture titled “Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort”75 and 
consequently “reopened” the debate on sovereign debt restructuring that had calmed in 
the first half of the 90s. In essence, he argued that the international financial system 
suffers from inefficiencies and an International Lender of Last Resort (ILLR) would in 
principle be justified. But as this is unlikely to be technically or politically feasible, the 
IMF should  give up its lending role and instead assume that of a bankruptcy court. 
Although the proposal lacked crucial details on what such a court should look like, 
Sachs primarily described the bankruptcy mechanism to apply not only to inefficient 
                                                 
74 With the idea that when these changes are widely implemented (or at least by decisive countries) the 
outcome would be a de facto international treaty as everybody abides by the rules. 
75 Sachs (1995), Princeton University Frank D. Graham Lecture, Princeton University, April 20. 
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workouts but also equally to self-fulfilling debt runs as in Mexico 1994/5. He proposed 
bankruptcy mechanisms as a solution to both problems, illiquidity and insolvency. The 
IMF would not have to distuingish between the two types of crises as both would be 
solved with IMF-endorsed payments standstills in combination with administrative 
priority of new private lending. This way, the IMF would also not have to sacrifice “tax 
payer dollars”. For Sachs, an ILLR and a bankruptcy court are thus substitutes, 
alternative ways to deal with self-fulfilling runs.76 Sachs does not consider debt write-
down to be necessary remedy but believes as standstill and new priority finance to 
restore value will be enough. After Sachs (1995), the discussion on sovereign 
bankruptcy procedures eventually started to gain momentum. For a comprehensive 
survey of the debate since Sachs (1995), interested readers can refer to 
Rogoff/Zettelmeyer (2002).  
 
4.3.2. The IMF Initiative 
 
Soon after Argentina’s most recent problems became apparent and the crisis in 
Turkey (2000/01) was still in fresh memory, Anne Krueger introduced her ideas on an 
international debt workout mechanism, the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM). The SDRM is largely in the tradition of the earlier ideas by Cohen (1989), and 
it is also inspired by the US Chapter 11. The SDRMs statutory nature is mainly 
grounded in the fact that the mechanism would have the force of law in any country 
where enforcement might be sought. This could be achieved by an amendment to the 
IMF Articles requiring every member country to ratify it. The SDRM consists of four 
elements, which relate to the central provisions of Chapter 11: 
 
1. Providing a standstill and an automatic legal stay of claims against the country in 
crisis to prevent a creditor grab race. 
2. Interim financing is given by the IMF, and preferential status is granted to creditors 
providing new money. The IMF would always continue to enjoy first priority on 
claims. 
3. Restructuring negotiations would be supervised by the IMF and the IMF would 
also implement this program together with the necessary conditionality in policy. 
                                                 
76 Sachs (1995), p.12. A similar argument is made in Diamond/Dybvig (1983). 
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4. Supermajority voting to bind minority holdout creditors to a restructuring 
agreement. 
 
The standstill would be active if the IMF endorses a request by the debtor-state. It 
could be extended by the IMF up to a certain maximum period, after which the 
majority of creditors would have to agree on prolongation. The Funds role would 
clearly be essential to the success of this system. Krueger claims the IMF is „the most 
effective channel through which the international community can reach a judgement on the sustainability 
of a country’s debt and of its economic policies“.77  
 
However, the word “IMF” is too prevailing in this first proposal. Every major 
decision is reached by the Fund. Having had to deal with a lot of criticism with regard 
to the excessive role of the IMF in her SDRM, Krueger took the opportunity to present 
a new scheme in the spring of 2002.78 The updated version of the SDRM substantially 
reduces the role of the IMF and increases that of creditors. The payments standstill is 
still granted together with a short legal stay, restricted to 90 days. The renewal of the 
stay is subject to a decision by a supermajority of creditors, not the IMF. Creditors also  
decide on preferred status for new money. Negotiations take place under the auspices 
of a neutral agency, again not the IMF.79 An IMF program can still be implemented. 
The new SDRM can thus said to be much more creditor-friendly than the initial 
SDRM. The SDRM would not have the powers to challenge decisions by the IMF 
regarding the adequacy of the county’s policies or the sustainability of its debt burden. 
At the same time it cannot override decisions by the majority of creditors and it cannot 
influence the classification of creditors. 
 
Meanwhile the SDRM has advanced to be a considerable policy alternative that is 
currently being further developed. By the first week of 2003, the IMF’s Board of 
Directors has repeatedly discussed the feasibility of an SDRM. A blueprint for the 
design of the SDRM was published on January 7th 2003 (IMF PIN 2003). It foresees 
the creation of a debt workout mechanism with a standing forum, the “Sovereign Debt 
Dispute Resolution Forum” (SDDRF). The SDDRF is the central element of an SDRM. 
                                                 
77 Krueger (2001). p. 5.  
78 See e.g. Raffer (2002), Eichengreen (2002), Taylor (2002) and eventually, Krueger (2002a). 
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 Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum 
 
In order to achieve impartiality and diversity in the composition of the SDDRF, 
the IMF proposes a voting process. In the beginning, every member country nominates 
one candidate. These would in turn vote on a committee consisting of internationally 
recognized experts in insolvency and debt restructuring, that the IMF Executive Board 
would then vote on. None of the elected members would work on a full time basis, but 
only be impaneled for single cases. The elected members then appoint a president of 
the forum to oversee the operations. Upon submission of an actual case, three 
members would be appointed by the president to handle the case.80  
 
Activation, Resolution and Termination 
 
The mechanism can be initiated exclusively by the debtor.81 Probably, the final 
mechanism will also endorse a legal stay on claims following its activation. (although 
the issue has not been undisputed).82 The SDDRF would have the powers to administer 
claims, i.e. play an informative and co-ordinatory role in initiation, negotiations and 
voting. As disputes between creditors and debtors are most likely to arise in 1. the 
verification of claims and 2. the integrity of the voting process, the forum would also be 
granted with powers of resolution. As for the verification of claims, it is necessary that 
no fictious claims are allowed to manipulate the process.83 The second point, the 
integrity of the voting process, is also a critical one: even if all claims are bona fide, the 
danger looms that some creditors with special relations to the debtor will receive 
undisclosed financial incentives to vote in a particular way. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
79 Although Krueger left open who would technically run this new “neutral agency”. As the new agency 
would be created through anamendment of the IMF Articles, the danger of IMF-prevalence is alive. 
80 Excluding members with potential conflicts of interest in the particular case. 
81 It is questionable whether the activation of the SDRM will require an independent confirmation, 
although this is very probable. A related issue is whether a stay on enforcement should be active 
immediately upon activation or upon affirmative vote by majority of creditors. 
82 It is currently under discussion in the IMF Board whether the SDRM would include a “legal stay” on 
creditor claims. While some directors at the IMF fear the credibility of the SDRM would be undermined 
without a legal stay, others feel that it would be a too radical abrogation of creditors rights. This issue 
therefore remains open. IMF PIN 2003, p. 3. 
83 Illegitimate claims (e.g. former dictators’ consumption) are one problem. Notwithstanding the 
legitimacy problem, these claims would most probably have to be included as they are de jure claims to 
the state and to hinder ambiguity in verification. 
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The forum would need to ensure the strictest possible safeguards to prevent 
abuses and to achieve uniformity in assessment and interpretation. The SDDRF has the 
right to terminate the operation early if it lacks a constructive purpose for one of the 
following reasons: 1. provision of false information or 2. general non-cooperation or 
inappropriate use of the framework.84 The third possibility of early termination is if a 
qualified majority of the creditors decide to do so. Under normal conditions the SDRM 
is automatically terminated upon succesful restructuring by the SDDRF.  
 
Scope of Claims 
 
A point of high relevance is the scope of claims the forum would adjudicate. It is an 
issue of utmost importance since any conflict or ambiguity in competence is likely to 
obstruct the smooth working of the mechanism. In a feasible SDRM, eligible claims could 
be:  
1. Commercial debt of the central government 
2. Central bank claims  
3. Claims of public entities and sub-national governments not subject to domestic 
bankruptcy legislation. 
 
The last two points are still fairly disputed. It is likely that the central government of 
each member country will be given the option to include, or exclude, central bank and 
subnational entity claims in the SDRM. 
 
On the other hand, claims to be excluded will be those that,  
1. Are anyhow subject to domestic bankruptcy law  
2. Are loans by IFI  
3. The debtor should be enabled to exclude certain types of claims (e.g. trade credit) 
when it is considered necessary to limit the extent of economic and financial 
dislocations. 
 
The initial Krueger proposal (2001) included domestic commercial debt of the 
sovereign into the SDRM next to debt owed to foreign creditors. However, the IMF’s 
                                                 
84 See IMF PIN 0306 (2003), p. 3. 
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Board of Directors decided that in order to preserve the credibility of domestic 
jurisdictions, domestic claims that are dealt with under domestic insolvency regulations 
will most probably remain outside the SDRM.85 The focus in their case is to strengthen 
the quality of domestic insolvency legislation, efforts that lie with agencies such as the 
UNCITRAL.86 It has also been claimed that the sovereign could exert regulatory 
influence on domestic creditors if they were included, and pressure them to vote in a 
certain way. The reasons for the exclusion of domestic debt of the sovereign certainly 
make sense. On the other hand, the inclusion of this debt would be helpful regarding 
inter-creditor equity. The exclusion carries some danger of causing free-rider problems 
between domestic and foreign creditors. Furthermore, a special treatment of foreign 
debt of non-sovereigns (e.g. trade credit) is an issue what an SDRM should regulate.87 
Capital outflow restrictions, that may possibly need to be imposed, should not be 
allowed to impede trade finance of the private sector, as this could easily generate a 
financial collapse. 
 
The final open question remains what to do with the bilateral loans of the Paris 
Club. Will they remain outside the SDRM altogether or be dealt with as a separate 
class? Some IMF Directors think that Paris Club claims should remain outside the 
SDRM but work in close co-operation.88 This is mainly because the inclusion of Paris 
Club creditors would require substantial changes in the Paris Club practices.89 On the 
other hand, not much, and particularly not the success of the Club, speaks against 
changing Paris Club procedures. The case indeed exists to include the Paris Club as a 
separate mandatory creditor class, again with regard to inter-creditor equity. 
 
Each IMF member country has to comply with the certifications of the SDRM and 
implement them in its territory. Krueger appears to be convinced that „a dispute resolution 
forum – small in size, limited in role, and demonstrably independent in its membership and operation 
                                                 
85 See IMF PIN 0306 (2002), p. 2. 
86 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
87 For this purpose, Eaton (2002) proposes an escrow account. Trade payment would be held on escrow 
for the duration of the capital controls.  
88 See IMF PIN (2003), p. 2. 
89 As explained, the Paris Club has been dealing with a window of claims falling due rather than the entire 
stock. The Club has also worked on the basis of unanimity. 
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– is the best way to achieve this.“90 The SDRM remains a hot topic on the international 
policy debate. This paper returns to evaluate the current outlook in the final chapter. 
 
4.3.3. An International Chapter 9 (FTAP) 
 
The US Chapter 9 applies to bankruptcies of municipalities in the United States. 
To a certain extent, Chapter 9 is based on Chapter 11. However, two central differences 
remain. Under Chapter 9, liquidation is impossible and the immunity of governmental 
powers is guaranteed. Chapter 9 explicitly forbids interference with the “governmental 
functions of the municipality”, whereas Chapter 11 subjects substantially all debtor 
activity under court oversight. Also, under Chapter 9 reorganization is coercive as a 
municipality cannot be liquidated. Kunibert Raffer, first proposing an “International 
Chapter 9” in 1990, saw in Chapter 9 an effective device to balance creditor interests 
with the welfare of affected citizens and national sovereignity (Raffer 1990). In addition 
to Raffer, some other authors have also considered Chapter 9 to be the more 
appropriate code in principle (Sachs 1995, Kaiser 2002). Raffer, Kaiser (2002) and 
Pettifor (2002) agree that Chapter 9 could also give debt resolution a “human face”. 
Raffers proposal has particularly been embraced by the Jubilee 2000 movement 
campaigning on behalf of forgiving all unsustainable developing country debt. The 
campaign has adopted the ideas under the name „Fair and Transparent Arbitration 
Procedure“ (FTAP). This paper uses the terms FTAP and „International Chapter 9“ as 
synonyms. 
 
An FTAP requires an international bankruptcy court, a “neutral court of 
arbitration” (Raffer 1990), that convenes on an ad hoc basis and consists of debtor and 
creditor representatives.91 Moreover, an attractive feature of the US Chapter 9 is that it 
includes hearings of stakeholder groups, such as employees and citizens of the 
municipalities.92 This is certainly a point of relevance in the sovereign context 
considering the immense negative externalities of sovereign default affecting citizens. If 
problems of democratic legitimacy can be solved, civil society hearings would ensure 
                                                 
90 See Krueger (2002c), p. 7. 
91 Debtors and creditor rerpresentatives would be equal in number. They would elect an n:th person to 
achieve and uneven number.  
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participation of affected citizens. The court would also judge whether debt contracts 
were legitimate or whether they were the product of reckless borrowing by corrupt 
government officials or dictators. Raffer claims that an International Chapter 9 would 
require only minor statutory changes. As the majority of sovereign debt is governed by 
US or UK law, an amendment to these sovereign immunity legislations (granting 
sovereigns immunity against litigation when a Chapter 9 procedure is started), should 
be sufficient.93  
 
The FTAP emphasizes the „protection“ of the poor. Any restructuring that is 
implemented, needs to ensure a certain existential minimum of the population. The 
government should still have the possibility to provide the basic social services and 
keep funds free to preserve some degree of fiscal freedom. These amounts could be 
calculated as a lump sum per head and would be directly written off from debt service. 
While this procedure is welcome in principle, creditors might doubt the efficacy of this 
policy as long as questions in equitable distribution and monitoring are not solved. The 
debtor would have to credibly ensure that these funds are not channeled into the 
pockets of the political elite. Furthermore, the FTAP claims that governments are often 
not concerned with the interests of the poor, but are corrupt and maximizers of self-
interest. For this purpose, a „right to be heard“ of the poor should be established. The 
task of representing the poor could be given to local Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) operating in the country, considered to be the true voices of the people. While 
a system that takes the interests of the poor into consideration is welcome in principle, 
the problems rise with the democratic legitimacy of these NGOs. Sovereign states may 
be highly reluctant to give representative legitimacy to NGOs. 
 
4.3.4. Eliminating Sovereign Immunity Waivers 
 
The Debevoise (1984) proposal called for an authorative interpretation of the 
IMF Articles granting the debtor-state extended legal immunity against uncoordinated 
                                                                                                                                         
92 Actually this is also included in Chapter 11 in order to provide management with an extra argument for 
reorganization. The stakeholders themselves however remain in the background in case of substantial 
decisions.  
93 It could be a sentence of the likes of „starting international insolvency procedures voids all waivers of immunity 
relting to this case“. The UK and US governments would then effectively close their courts to claims against 
other countries in the event of bankruptcy.  
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creditor claims in the event of bankruptcy. However, as explained in connection with 
the debtor’s incentives, such legal immunity might not be desirable ex ante. If the 
waivers of sovereign immunity are the only „enforcement technology“ in creditors 
hands and the only „commitment vehicle for repayment“ of the debtor, their waiving 
carries the danger of draining international sovereign credit markets completely.  
 
This argument of forcing sovereign states into complete immunity leads directly 
to a final contribution under the umbrella of statutory changes. A prominent proponent 
of the policy is Bulow (2002).94 In his proposal the symptom consists of moral hazard 
on both debtors and creditors side. The disease underlying to the symptoms are the 
waivers of sovereign immunity. “If the modern view of moral hazard is right, and debtors will 
borrow as much as they want and creditors will make uneconomic loans, then a feasible solution would 
be to waive these rights to enforce contracts anywhere else than in the debtor countries themselves.”95 
Bulow notes that many emerging market and developing country policy-makers have a 
bias toward “socially inefficient budgets”.96 Debtors borrow too much and their very 
ability to do so internationally further distorts this. “There becomes a question of the extent to 
which we should allow outside enforcement technology, say the laws of the US and Great Britain, to 
enable third world governments to borrow more than they could manage otherwise”.97 While domestic 
bankruptcy systems involve trade-offs and a paternalistic desire to control the debtor’s 
ability to pay, Bulow’s international solution would be radical, but presumably effective. 
The central motivation is to shape incentives in order to shift borrowing on domestic 
jurisdictional grounds, as only there creditors would have the protection of the law.98 
For Rogoff (1999), the elimination of sovereign immunity waivers would contribute to 
“put [international] equity and debt finance on a more even footing”.99 The sovereign debtor 
would effectively be in the same boat as the private creditors. In this system, debtor 
countries could gain an incentive to try to create conditions that would cause residents 
to repatriate their foreign capital. Good policies of democratic governments would be 
rewarded since they are most likely to continue receiving finance, but by the same token 
the risks of lending to corrupt governments will shoot up. Bulow realizes that the 
                                                 
94 See also Rogoff (1999), Bulow/Rogoff (1990), Hurlock (1995).  
95 See Bulow (2002), p. 15. 
96 In other words: they are corrupt. 
97 See Bulow (2002), p. 7. 
98 A similar point is made by Krugman (1998). Trying to decrease the foreign debt leverage of domestic 
debtors is a feasible way to reduce the country’s contagious vulnerability in crisis. 
99 See Rogoff (1999), p. 38. 
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overall amount of lending would certainly decrease in the short and middle run but 
states that is not necessarily bad. This holds especially true keeping in mind that there is 
no evidence on the general beneficiality of opening capital markets for sovereigns in the 
way they have been opened.  
 
Critics of the Bulow-approach like to point to the difficulties eliminating 
sovereign immunity waivers brings with regard to international human rights law 
guaranteeing court access to everyone whose rights have been violated 
(Eichengreen/Portes 1995). Moreover, there has been a general trend away from 
sovereign immunity and this is getting stronger in recent years (Paulus 2002). 
Eliminating the waivers would run contrary to this trend. Roubini (2002) is particularly 
harsh to criticize the Bulow (2002) approach. He reminds that of the crises of the last 
decade, only the most recent one in Argentina had mainly to do with foreign issued 
debt of the government. In Asia, the crises were caused by private liabilities. In Mexico, 
Brazil, Turkey and Russia most borrowing, although public in nature, was issued at 
home.100 In virtually all these cases the foreign currency liabilities of the private financial 
system were subject to a run in tandem to the run on sovereign claims, mostly 
determining the final severity of the crisis. In consequence, as long as the ability of the 
private sector to borrow internationally is not restricted, restricting the sovereign’s 
ability to borrow internationally runs the risk of being toothless. The needs of the 
sovereign could just be financed indirectly (e.g. over the banking system).  
 
Roubini (2002) is certainly right. A broader strategy is indeed necessary to make 
the immunity waiver elimination a success. Two of these measures could be the 
following: 1. Correcting the bias toward debt finance. Rogoff (1999) states that one crucial 
problem today is the strong legal bias toward debt finance in international lending. The 
predominance of debt finance (mainly in the private sector) discriminates equity finance 
and foreign direct investment (FDI). The latter forms of investment would be more 
desirable as they include an automatic device for risk sharing. Moreover, as short-term 
debt has recently been a considerable problem, FDI and other equity finance would 
cause the maturity structure of debt to expand and thus contribute to more stability. 
Less foreign (short-term) debt would certainly have been considerable remedy for the 
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East Asian crisis. 2. Keep the IFI out of the bailout business. When investors engaged in 
Mexico, Turkey, Brazil and Russia, where the problem debt was issued at home, it was 
because they knew they would get bailed out in countries “too-big-to-fail”.  
                                                                                                                                         
4.4. Contractual Proposals 
 
The contractual solutions for sovereign debt workouts first entered the debate 
after Mexico 1994/5. They apply first and foremost to bond contracts. Effectively, the 
remedy concerns  mostly middle-income countries (emerging markets) as bonds are not 
a considerable issue with low-income country debt. Considering the broad use of 
sovereign bonds, it is certain that if an emerging market sovereign experiences debt-
servicing difficulties, bonds will be a considerable part of the problem. 
 
4.4.1. Collective Action Clauses 
 
The modification of contracts consists of including Collective Action Clauses („CACs“ 
herafter) in bond contracts. The most prominent advocate of CACs has been Barry 
Eichengreen.101 Together with Richard Portes (Eichengreen/Portes 1995) he advocated 
the potentially useful contribution of CACs in sovereign debt restructuring. The 
solution that Eichengreen/Portes develop is an approach of voluntary ex ante 
arbitration. CACs would serve to shape creditor ex ante incentives through the 
anticipation of majority voting. In general, one can lay out four different forms of 
CACs (Dixon/Wall 2000):  
 
1. Majority action clauses (MACs), that allow a qualified majority of creditors to 
change the terms of debt which is binding on dissenting bondholders. This 
majority threshold is usually set at 75%. This is the provision most referred 
to in the literature, since it is the central element dealing with the stranghold 
of unanimity. Often MACs and CACs are used as synonyms. 
2. Collective representation clauses determine the mechanisms with which 
discussions among bondholders and in their relation to the issuer are co-
100 Domestic and foreign currency issued locally: GKOs in Russia, Tesobonos in Mexico and other debt 
in Turkey and Brazil. See Roubini (2002), p. 12. 
101 See Eichengreen/Portes 1995, Eichengreen 2000, 2002, Eichengreen/Mody 2000. 
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ordinated. These clauses address the practical problems created by widely 
disseminated bonds, especially as many are registered in bearer form, lacking 
central registry of the current holders. 
3. Sharing clauses, ensuring that all repayments by the debtor, irrelevant of the 
initial addressee, are distributed pro rata among creditors. A sharing clause 
thus removes the incentives of hold out creditors to act against a majority 
agreement. 
4. Non-acceleration clauses require a minimum threshold of bondholders before a 
claim cane be accelerated and immediate repayment of debt can be 
demanded. This threshold again is usually set at 25%, matching reciprocally 
with the majority action threshold. 
 
CACs are not a new idea. As already mentioned before, the UK and Canada 
usually include at least MACs in bond agreements. The widespread use of CACs has 
been advocated by a number of expert committees, most prominently by the Rey 
Report (G-10, 1996).102 The message was also echoed by a series of G-22 and G-7 
reports and declarations. The G-7 then placed the issue on its agenda for reform of the 
international financial system. Their adoption has also been advocated by the IMF. 
They have even been discussed as a necessary complement of an application for credit 
under the IMFs Contingent Credit Line (CCL – as of 1997). However, the IMF has not 
come to require their adoption.  
 
4.4.2. Problems with CACs 
 
The First Mover Problem 
 
The further adoption of CACs outside the UK and Canada has been practically 
inexistent, reflecting the inherent obstacle of CACs. Their implementation cannot be 
left to market forces and countries because there is a first mover problem preventing 
them to be adopted autonomously. Buchheit/Gulati (2002) call this a „drafting inertia“. 
The reluctance to adopt CACs exists because countries fear that it will raise their costs 
                                                 
102 The G-10 report was mainly concerned with minimizing moral hazard for both debtors and creditors. 
It stated that developments in the direction improving communication between debtor and creditors are 
the necessary step and they should be market led, but receiving official support as appropriate. 
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of borrowing. Although this concern is at best speculative and is not supported 
empirically it is still deeply rooted in the beliefs of many emerging-market policy-
makers who oppose CACs. On the side of the creditor community, the same fears 
exist. A country that adopts CACs could be judged to be more inclined to default. 
Among the impediments to embrace CACs the moral hazard argument also holds; as 
long as a bailout can be expected, sovereigns and their creditors will be reluctant to 
embrace more complicated debt instruments regulating the event of default. 
 
What is likely to become necessary to provide incentive for the exchange is 
some form of subsidy. There is a case for the international community to subsidize or 
enforce the CAC use, as a serious signalling problem exists in their adoption. 
 
Aggregation and Transition 
 
A statutory procedure provides a centralized mechanism to aggregate claims 
across different creditor classes (single bond issues, bank debt etc.) Furthermore, a 
statutory procedure would naturally apply to all existing claims, not only to new debt 
issues. CACs cannot directly address these problems. First, normal CACs work issue by 
issue and do not ensure creditor coordination across groups and classes. Also, CACs 
would have to be made universal, i.e. applying not only to bonds but all commercial 
debt of the sovereign, to prevent asset substitution.103 These difficulties have become 
known as the aggregation (or universality) problem. Second, there is a transition 
problem with CACs. When CACs are only included in new issues, it would take a long 
time before the stock of outstanding debt can positively be restructured.  
 
First to the severity of the aggregation problem: One can distinguish 
aggregation for litigation (i.e. vulture fund action) and aggregation for acceptance of 
restructuring terms. If CACs set majority thresholds only within classes and not 
universally, litigation is easier when aggregation to accelerate a claim requires only a 
fraction of creditors of this individual issue (rather than a fraction of the entire debt). 
With the traditional MACs alone, this problem certainly persists. However, if other 
CACs such as non-acceleration clauses and sharing clauses are implemented, this 
                                                 
103 Friends of the debtor (e.g. state owned banks) may buy some of the existing debt and then vote in his 
favour.  
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problem could be solved.104 The second identified aggregation problem is present in 
negotiations for restructuring. Single classes will want to be the last to settle with the 
debtor, believing that by doing so they will receive better terms. They will be reluctant 
to reach agreement in the anticipation that other classes will also continue holding out. 
This is a serious co-ordination problem across issues that carries the potential to block 
any acceptable result. Any clause applying within classes could not solve this problem as it 
would not provide for inter-class co-ordination. 
 
The second problem with the adoption of CACs is the transition problem. The 
negative consequences for liquidity emerge when a „two-tier“105 bond market develops. 
In this situation two simultaneous markets exist, one for bonds with and the other for 
bonds without CACs. Liquidity could be short as the old bonds are considered more 
attractive from the creditors point of view. The transition period from old bonds to 
new bonds with CACs will have to be shortened by attempting to exchange old issues 
with new bonds. Moreover, a further requirement is that this exchange will have to be 
voluntary. If coercive measures were implemented to force markets to swap, this is 
likely to lead to litigation. The crucial requirement is that holding out is not a superior 
option markets are left with. This will be the case only when markets are convinced that 
higher pay-offs are no longer to be expected.  
  
4.4.3. Proponents of Contractual Reform  
 
Barry Eichengreen  
 
Opting for MACs in debt contracts, Eichengreen/Portes (1995) propose an 
international „Bondholder Council“ to complement the Paris and London Clubs. 
Creditor conventions should thus be easier to organize. Through a reinterpretation of 
its Article VIII (2)(b), the IMF should also be enabled to better sanction standstills in 
the event of panic. Although without clear mandates in its Articles, this „sanctioning“ 
would presumably just remain a form of mere „encouragement“. The sanctioning is 
designed to work together with the MACs in contracts. In some circumstances, the 
                                                 
104 As this majority threshold for litigation is usually set at 25% of the issue in most proposals, one could 
think of raising this threshold to say 75% to make litigation increasingly difficult.  
105 Essentially a system with two “rankings” or “grades”. 
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IMF should also be allowed to provide large scale financing to prevent contagion and 
self-fulfilling runs.  
 
The argument was developed in a more recent contribution by Eichengreen 
(2000). Compared to Eichengreen/Portes (1995), the IMF-endorsed standstill is now 
more authorative and constitutes a clear second element of the strategy. The remedy 
differs whether one is faced with a solvency or a liquidity crisis. A standstills is a fine 
measure to address liquidity crises but it provide little remedy for problems of debt 
sustainability since all it grants is a window of time. The MACs then again are designed 
to facilitate the free riding problems inherent in restructuring, necessary in case of 
solvency problems where debt write-down is indispensable. For Eichengreen, this 
difference has important implications for debtor behavior. In the case of a pure panic 
(illiquidity), the debtor should be able to repay the full amount after the crisis. But in a 
case of debt restructuring, where write-down is necessary, debtor good behavior needs 
to be ensured throughout the process.  
 
The IMFs leverage with regard to the debtor would be limited as it would not 
have powers to remove a standstill (merely to disapprove of it). It is only able to offer 
the bonus of some lending. However, IMF powers would not be necessary as standstills 
alone do not require any painful negotiation attempts by the debtor and therefore are 
unlikely to cause debtor moral hazard. The weakness of the IMF could matter in 
restructuring where debtor good faith and possible policy adjustments become 
necessary. Yet as the system relies on realigning ex ante incentives through MACs, it 
thereby implicitly hopes that ex post intervention turns out to be unnecessary. In order 
to make countries adopt the MACs, Eichengreen (2000) calls to allow the IMF to 
increase its available funds and offer more attractive lending terms to countries. The 
IMF would thus offer the „carrot“ of some (conditional) lending in exchange for the 
adoption of MACs. 
 
The US Treasury Proposal 
 
After Anne Krueger had introduced the revolutionary SDRM, one of the most 
expected reactions was that of the US Treasury. Until then, the USA had been reluctant 
about organized sovereign bankruptcy procedures because “it is not appropriate for the 
  -51-
official sector to mandate the terms of debt contracts between countries and their creditors”.106 The 
USA possesses blocking minority on IMF decisions, and its stance is crucial for any real 
international policy change. In April 2002, US Treasury undersecretary for international 
affairs, John Taylor met this expectation. Taylor (2002a) made it clear that, in his 
opinion, mechanisms to deal with sovereign bankruptcy in order to be feasible should 
be market oriented and decentralized. He planned to address failures with a set of 
clauses very similar to those outlined above (p. 48). The inclusion of other contingency 
clauses in addition to the traditional MACs can be seen as an effort to mimic what 
could be done under an SDRM. Debt contracts would include an initiation clause for a 
standstill to prevent a grab race, a representation clause for organized negotiations 
between creditors and the debtor. As for MACs, Taylor saw no legal reason why they 
should not be adopted and issued under New York law as well. The only feature of the 
SDRM his proposal could not mimc was that of priority finance. Taylor apparently did 
not see the problem as being that crucial believing that existing IFI finance methods 
were sufficient. Answering the question on how incentives could be shaped in a way 
that countries adopted these clauses, Taylor favored the system of „carrots and sticks“. 
Countries implementing the changes would receive lower interest rates for IMF lending 
and further financial inducements to carry out bond swaps on the existing stock. The 
„stick“ would be the withholding of IMF support if measures are not taken.  
 
The “carrots and sticks” approach carries one crucial flaw: In a situation of 
looming or existing crisis, interest rates are not likely to play any role in a sovereigns 
plea for IMF assistance. The provision of capital is desired almost independent of the 
cost. Requiring different interest rates would in principle also run contrary to the 
„comparability of treatment“ provision in the Articles of the IMF. It could therefore 
only be accomplished by amending the IMF Articles. But if one sets the initiative to 
amend Articles, it means statutory reform in the definition of this paper. In the end, 
contractual and statutory reform might be complementary to a certain degree.  
                                                 
106 Summers, Larry (1999). Speech at the London School of Economics, June 6th.   
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4.5. Stabilizing Debt Prices   
 
Lerrick/Meltzer (2001) propose an IMF supported workout mechanism that 
would stablize debt prices. The substantiation of the problem lies in price dynamics. 
Consider asymmetric information as a problem among creditors. If liquidity problems 
force a creditor to reduce a position, it may be difficult to sell this position on the 
market, because there is only a small group of traders informed about the country in 
question. This group typically consists of creditors already engaged in business with that 
country. They may not be willing to extend their engagement, especially since they are 
hit with the same shocks as the initial creditor. Therefore, in the event of a crisis a 
group of informed sellers meets the market of uninformed potential buyers. Market 
prices are likely to be below their fundamental values. Such “firesales” are crucial 
momenta of self-fulfilling downward spirals. 
 
Lerrick/Meltzer (2001) argue that the key determinant of recent financial crises 
in the 90s has been creditor moral hazard. For this purpose, they foresee an IMF-
endorsed standstill during which creditor-debtor negotiations take place, and introduce 
one element that adresses the price spiral problem: the first objective of an 
unsustainable debt situation is the prevention of market collapse. Their mechanism 
allows the sovereign to announce an official bid for the repurchase of its debt. A debt 
write-down would be accompanied by an official floor of support for the bond prices to 
keep them falling under a certain threshold. This official support would come from the 
IMF in the form of unconditional lending. The Fund could also set the floor price at 
some 80-85% of the fraction of the debt that is considered sustainable. The moment 
the bond prices reach this minimum, the IMF would intervene. The floor must be low 
enough to keep creditors holding on to their claims and provide incentives to 
restructure. It cannot, however, be too low as this would not be capable to restore 
market stability.  
 
The only purposes of IMF lending would be to prevent fire sales of bonds, keep 
their prices at reasonable levels and sustain liquidity during restructuring. In this sense 
Lerrick/Meltzer present a different assessment of the creditor panic problem: a 
standstill alone will not stave off the collective action problems. The speculation about 
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the market pricing of bonds will continue. Consequently prices have to be stabilized 
during standstills. Legal instruments to protect the debtor from litigation by creditors 
are not necessary. The debt price floor would effectively reduce the incentives of 
creditors to litigate (if the face value is not much higher than the floor price). A crucial 
element in Lerrick/Meltzer is the assessment of sovereign insolvency. Correctly 
identifying insolvency is essential, since the framework should only apply to 
unsustainable debt situations where write-down is essential.  
 
However, it is questionable whether the IMF could credibly work as a rule-
based price-stabilizer in the absence of mandates. Although the Lerrick/Meltzer 
proposal is not directly a statutory one as no new treaty or organization is created, the 
changes necessary in IMF policy (e.g. amendment of Articles) might require some 
statutory reform and thus render it a statutory proposal, at least in the definition this 
paper has adopted.  
4.6. Implications for Policy  
 
4.6.1. A Synthesis of Ideas  
 
Numerous contributions developed in recent history point out different 
inefficiencies and deliver different solutions to problems around sovereign debt. The 
solutions emerging for the 80s debt crisis already demonstrated the variety in 
interpretation. For Debevoise (1984), the crucial point was the possibility of 
uncoordinated legal enforcement against a debtor. Kaeser (1990) was exclusively 
concerned with the sovereign debtor‘s motivation to keep its external debt profile 
below a certain threshold. And finally, Cohen’s International Debt Restructuring 
Agency (Cohen 1989) is representative for an early proposal for a bankruptcy court 
modelled after Chapter 11, which unified a number of aspects and motivations.  
 
The more recent proposals eventually widened the scope on the motivation of a 
sovereign bankruptcy procedure. The Sachs lecture (Sachs 1995) is central because it 
served as a trigger to (re)start the debate on sovereign bankruptcy. Taking self-fulfilling 
debt runs and moral hazard as new pivotal phenomena Lerrick/Meltzer (2001) hoped 
to address the problem by subsidizing bond prices. The Krueger (2001, 2002) proposals 
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for an SDRM picked up ideas from a number of sources, Sachs (1995) and Cohen 
(1989) among others. On one hand, her views are being challenged by a contractual 
case made by Eichengreen/Portes (1995), Eichengreen (2000, 2002) as well as Taylor of 
the US Treasury (2002). Krueger’s SDRM indeed carries the merit of having achieved a 
considerable impact in solution design since it has encouraged the US Treasury to 
embrace pecuniary incentives for the adoption of CACs. The Taylor proposal is the 
most important contractual proposal for policy at present, since it represents the views 
of the US Treasury. By the end of 2002, all contributions to the subject react to 
Krueger (2002) and Taylor (2002) as it has become clear that policy is going to revolve 
around these two proposals. On the other hand, the voices advocating a Fair and 
Transparent Arbitration Procedure (FTAP) following the initial Raffer (1990) proposal 
for an International Chapter 9 also remain active.  
 
SDRM vs. CACs 
 
The features of the two central proposals the international community is 
currently discussing, Krueger’s SDRM and Taylors CACs are summarized in the 
following table. For the purpose of illustration the proposals are compared to presently 
applied proceedings: 
 
Table 4.1.: Key Features of Debt Workouts107 
Scheme / 
Feature 
Stopping A Grab 
Race 
Financing 
Reorganization 
Restructuring 
Debt 
Restraining 
Holdouts 
Status Quo Unilateral standstills IMF lending Bond swaps (US) + 
CACs (UK)  
(Paris Club, London 
Club)  
Exit consents 
(US) + CACs 
(UK) 
SDRM Payments standstill 
plus short legal stay, 
which may be 
renewed 
Preferred creditor 
status for new 
money* 
Negotiations 
supervised by 
SDDRF plus IMF 
program 
Supermajority 
voting across 
classes* 
US Treasury Initiation clauses to 
allow for payments 
to be suspended 
 Representation 
clauses governing 
rules for meeting   
Supermajority 
voting clauses 
plus arbitration 
* to be decided upon by a supermajority of creditors 
                                                 
107 Source: Miller (2002), p. 4, modifications by the author. 
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 The SDRM aims at a broader range of problems including the preferred status 
for new money. The Taylor proposal mimics most of the provisions of an SDRM 
except for the new money problem. Moreover, the CACs of the Taylor proposal are 
more of an “endogenous variable”, as their adoption will not be self-enforcing.  
 
The Taylor-system of carrots for CAC adaption in the form of IMF programs 
indeed bears a central shortcoming. If IMF lending were the only carrot to implement 
necessary changes, what would move all countries not having to negotiate an IMF 
program to adopt such changes? Moreover, would the time consistency problem of the 
IMF not persist? Recall the much-repeated scenario where a country did not abide by 
certain policy requirements and crisis hits. The IMF cannot withhold assistance and 
falls into the same credibility trap over and over again. Knowing that the IMF has an 
incentive to intervene, countries already sceptical about CACs will not implement 
reform. 
 
Essentially the same authors that call for CACs have now come to point to the 
prospective need of changes or amendments in domestic or international law to make 
CACs a success (Eichengreen 2002, Taylor 2002). The solution could be to amend the 
IMF Articles and requiring a uniform set of CACs for all new loan agreements in all 
IMF member countries. The amendment could address the problems of majority 
action, representation, sharing and non-acceleration.108 Even with an ambitious 
contractual solution without any significant treaties to follow, statutes may well become 
necessary to assure the adequate functioning of the contracts. Eichengreen (2002) calls 
this a „Krueger-like process for a Taylor-like result“. Amending the IMF Articles will 
be necessary in any case, but Eichengreen hopes that the outcome would be the 
market-based solution. Whether the outcome is “Taylor-like”, or eventually “Krueger-
like”, remains open.  
 
Once put into practice, the differences between the statutory CACs and an SDRM 
persist in a different way. The CAC approach would leave jurisdiction to the national 
                                                 
108 Funds would be needed in order to underwrite the costs of market-based exchanges to retire existing 
stock of old issues without these clauses. This is where the World Bank and other regional development 
banks could join the effort. 
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courts under which they are issued. Also, outstanding debt would remain untouched 
until maturing obligations are replaced with new issues containing CACs. Leave aside 
the problem of transition, and imagine all outstanding debt could be dealt with in a 
mega-swap. The CACs would still pose mainly three problems.  
 
1. A working voting procedure would need to aggregate across all claims. The 
question in a CAC approach remains how different outcomes across instruments 
would be reconciled? This would most likely require making CACs aggregate across 
all creditor classes. However, these kinds of „super-CACs“ are problematic and 
their adoption involves an even stronger drafting inertia than normal CACs.  
2. Uniformity of language can hardly be assured across all jurisdictions and across all 
instruments. Even if identical language is used, this does not yet grant uniformity in 
judicial interpretation.  
3. Laws in some member countries do not provide a clear statutory basis on the 
grounds of which rights of minority creditors could be modified unvoluntarily.109  
 
In the end, the CACs are in fact a distant second to the SDRM in providing 
assurance on universality of coverage and interpretation. The relative merits of the 
SDRM lie in its enhanced transparency and accountability since it provides an 
aggregation mechanism for claims and a standing forum to ensure the integrity of the 
process.  
 
SDRM vs. FTAP 
 
The Fair and Transparent Arbitration Procedure is similar to the SDRM in 
various respects. Both call for a statutory mechanism without remarkable international 
bureaucracies or personnel and have very similar tools to address the central problems 
in bankruptcy. However, they are also different in critical respects. 
 
In the FTAP, all creditors would be equal, whereas in Krueger the IFI continue 
to enjoy first priority on claims. The FTAP would not amend the powers of the IMF, 
the Fund would merely become one of the creditors. For Raffer, the undue preference 
of IFI in sovereign lending distorts incentives and yields less repayment to other 
                                                 
109 See Krueger (2002c). 
  -57-
creditors. Just like any financial consultant, the IMF should be held accountable for its 
advice. The IMF presently continues to be a „creditor in its own right and a judge in its own 
cause“, Raffer claims.110 If the IMF always gets paid out first, the link between decision 
and risk is disturbed and market efficiency is severely damaged. Raffer would grant the 
Fund full participation in the procedure and notes that it could possibly provide 
technical assistance in bondholder co-ordination. It could also provide funding to 
sustain liquidity. New loans could then enjoy preferred status, as would all funds 
injected for the same reason. However, it should not attach them to presently enforced 
conditionality-requirements. IMF-lending under the FTAP would be unconditional.  
 
Another difference between the FTAP and the SDRM lies in the scope of the 
debtor states the mechanism would effectively apply to. The FTAP wants to see 
arbitration used for all countries with unsustainable debt burdens, including HIPCs. 
The FTAP seems to envisage a number of cases for the beginning until all developing 
country debt is linked to a sustainable path. The SDRM in turn does not expect to 
solve all existing debt overhang and rather includes the motivation of solving future 
cases, especially emerging market debt problems. Krueger predicts a longer time period 
before the necessary changes in the Articles are adopted, and states that any new 
statutory mechanism would come too late for present cases. Moreover, the IMF is 
unlikely to be willing to see its efforts under the HIPC initiative undermined through 
interference in competence by an SDRM. In the IMF view, the two programs should 
merely be well co-ordinated.   
 
It can be concluded that the FTAP addresses a number of crucial shortcomings 
in the international financial system as well as in the developing countries’ political and 
economic landscapes. It is also quite accurate in criticizing various IMF policies. 
However, a number of issues the FTAP advocates are liable to be politically unrealistic 
or unfeasible to monitor and to execute succesfully. For one, the scope of powers the 
FTAP envisages for the international bankruptcy tribunal does not seem feasible at 
present. The concessions the creditors would make toward the debtor-state are 
certainly economically sensible in serious cases of overindebtedness. However, as long 
                                                 
110 See Raffer (2002), p. 5. 
  -58-
as the creditor uncertainty on abuse of central elements of the FTAP is not effectively 
mitigated, it does not seem to have a chance to survive in a political debate.  
 
Objections to an SDRM 
 
Raffer criticizes Krueger’s SDRM as only superficially restricting the IMF’s 
decisive powers. For Raffer, the SDRM is still much too IMF-centered and not 
sufficiently transparent and participative. The IMF would remain in the position of 
endorsing a payments standstill. The Fund would also be the instance to determine debt 
sustainability, and judge the debtor’s economic policies. „As determining the sustainable level 
of debts means determining the necessary reduction of claims, very little substance would remain in those 
hands where it should be according to Krueger“.111 Raffer is harsh in criticizing the IMF’s claim 
to be the „most effective channel…“ to reach decisions. He argues with a touch of sarcasm 
that the IMF has mostly not been able to put debtors on an economically sound basis 
and consequently, a high number of failures in IMF policies render further adjustment 
programs necessary. For Raffer, „IMF-flops are securing IMF-jobs“,112 and the insistence of 
the IMF on the implementation of its programs is grounded in institutional self-interest 
rather than good economics.  
 
Substantial doubts remain among Raffer (2002), Taylor (2002), and Eichengreen 
(2002) that the SDRM de facto transfers the power to activate the standstill from the 
debtor government to the IMF. Granting more expansive powers to the IMF is likely to 
be regarded as adding to the uncertainty that already exists. It has also been criticized 
that creating an international agency to monitor and coordinate the process of 
renegotiation carries the danger of only adding to the bureaucracy (Eichengreen 2002). 
The need for a mediator may very well exist, as creditors and the debtor may not trust 
each other’s determination to negotiate in good faith. Meanwhile, according to these 
critics, there is no persuasive argument why creditors and debtors would not be able to 
appoint a mediator on their own on an ad hoc basis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
111 See Raffer (2002), p. 2. 
112 See Raffer (2002), p. 4. 
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4.6.2. Expected Policy 
 
Official Sector 
 
Following the strong contractual case made by the US Treasury together with 
acrimonious voices from the markets, Krueger approved the primary feasibility of 
CACs in spite of their shortcomings. The most important benefit of CACs is that they 
can be put faster into working. For all their shortcomings, Krueger is convinced that at 
the end of the day a statutory underpinning is going to be necessary (Krueger 2002c). 
The contractual approach, much along the lines of the Taylor-proposal, is now the first 
„track“ of a twin-track approach and is designed to provide the acid test for new 
sovereign debt policies. If CACs do the job, that could be the end of the story. Yet if 
they do not, the second and complementary track involves creating the SDRM.  
 
The US Treasury and the IMF appear to become the decisive players in policy-
making for a reform in sovereign debt restructuring processes. The IMF’s Board of 
Directors also supports an SDRM (although details remain open). The impact of other 
international players, especially the EU, should not be ignored. In any case, the degree 
to which the EU members (mostly represented individually) will have effective powers 
depends on their success to join forces and speak with one voice. The EU has not 
initiated any proposal of its own, but has nonetheless shown the way in one respect: it 
has recently agreed on collectively including CACs in all EU-member’s bond contracts 
issued under foreign jurisdictions.113 Hopes are alive that the example of the EU will 
move European emerging market countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary) to adopt CACs in 
the foreseeable future. Taylor of the US Treasury has repeatedly confirmed his active 
support for contractual reform, however simultaneously keeping the options open for 
further action (i.e. SDRM) if deemed necessary.  
 
Markets 
 
Without the approval of international financial actors, reform is unlikely to be a 
success. Fortunately, one might think, there has been some support for an orderly 
                                                 
113 See Taylor (2002b), p. 1.  
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approach for sovereign bankruptcy from an association representing foreign 
bondholders, as seen in this statement:   
“"During the autumn of last year, a conference of jurists and public men of various 
countries ... [discussed] ... the possibility of international agreements upon the principles 
of law which should determine the liability of sovereign states and foreign subjects in their 
relations to one another. ... There can be no question as to the advantage that would 
result from such an agreement."114 
 
If only this quote from the annual report of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders was dated 2002 and not 1874. Today, one is unlikely to hear such 
statements from major market actors. There are a number of opponents of reform 
among international financial professionals who see no need, or rather no feasibility, to 
do anything more than to show more resolution and not to throw official money into 
emerging market problems.115 The argument is largely along the following lines: „When 
both debtors and creditors have negotiated constructively in good faith, negotiations have been quick to 
produce results. Creditors have been capable to form representation committees when things have gone 
seriously wrong. And in cases where the debtor has not simply declared default and restructuring a fait 
accompli (as in Russia 1998 and Ecuador 1999), creditors have honored the co-operation.“116 If 
warnings about the difficulties of market-based restructurings were disregarded and the 
IMF together with the financial community showed more „backbone“, a healthier 
system would be self-executing. The architects of a new bankruptcy procedure are thus 
claimed to be preoccupied with a non-problem.  
 
Faced with the determination of the official sector and largely failed „more 
backboned“ policies of the IMF and the US treasury (see Argentina), markets have 
generally come to accept CACs to some extent. They threaten to embrace CACs in 
sovereign bond contracts only if plans for a SDRM are abolished. Markets seem to 
hope that the SDRM will fall either through its “own weight” or in the US Congress 
(where US policy is decided on). Single voices from the markets have already joined the 
proposal-game by submitting their own versions of CAC-approaches.117 The Emerging 
Markets Trading Association (Chamberlin 2002) set out two principles for CACs in 
                                                 
114 Annual report of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1874) in Krueger (2002d), p. 1. 
115 See e.g. Roubini (2002), Chamberlin (2002), Porczecanski (2002). 
116 Roubini 2002, p. 8. 
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order for them to be acceptable. First, the clauses must be “marketable” in the sense 
that they must be acceptable by the marketplace of creditors and debtors. Second, to 
the extent that the clauses make bonds easier to restructure, they should not also make 
defaults and/or restructurings more likely. 
  
5.  Conclusion  
 
5.1. Final Assessment: Centralized or Decentralized Approach? 
 
The contractual solution appears to be the most prudent and feasible first step. 
If the IMF and G-7 governments push for the inclusion of CACs in the Argentine debt 
that will eventually have to be restructured, they could effectively enforce their use as a 
precondition for international support. The problem is still likely to remain that the 
restructured Argentine debt is going to enter the market with remarkable spreads, 
which in turn is not going to encourage other emerging market officials to adopt CACs 
free of influence.  
 
In the light of the functional complementarities, one could go from speaking of 
statutory vs. contractual approaches to calling them the centralized vs. decentralized 
approach.118 In other words, it is not so much about contracts or statutes anymore as 
these are likely to be intertwinned and complementary anyway, but more about where 
decisions are made. In order for the SDRM to resemble the ambitious CAC approach, 
the following criteria must be met. First, the SDRM should encourage early creditor 
participation and provide incentives for negotiations instead of a blueprint for 
restructuring waiting in Washington (or anywhere else). Secondly, the most important 
decisions affecting creditors should not be made by the SDDRF but by a qualified 
majority of the creditors themselves. It is important that the SDRM only provides a 
broad framework. The preservation of an essentially voluntary and market-based 
atmosphere is vital for the success of the system. In the end, any mechanism will be as 
effective as creditors and debtors want it to be. Also, the IMF’s implicit role in an 
                                                                                                                                         
117 One of them envisages a majority action clause set at 95%, requirements of timely information 
delivery for the debtor as well as negative pledge covenants previously not included in CACs. See 
Debevoise (2002), p. 3. 
118 Terminology used by Taylor (2002b) and Miller (2002) among others. 
  -62-
SDRM may still be suspiciously broad. Given that agreement can be reached on the 
issue of IMF-discretion in the new SDRM, it seems difficult to be strongly in favour of 
ambitious CACs, implicitly acknowledging that collective action is an important issue, 
and at the same time to strongly oppose the current SDRM.  
 
5.2. The Real Challenge 
 
First, the effective scope of a bankruptcy procedure should be clear. What 
countries would a new sovereign bankruptcy procedure effectively help? For the sake 
of argument, restrict the motivations for bankruptcy procedures to two central aspects: 
collective action problems among creditors and the debtor’s fresh start from 
insolvency. For middle-income countries with multiple creditor classes, the collective 
action problem is probably the more crucial and complex one. For HIPCs, the fresh-
start aspect is certainly the more relevant aspect. The problem to be mitigated in the 
their case is an enormous debt trap from which they will not recover without 
substantial debt write-down. However, a bankruptcy procedure in the HIPC case will 
presumably not be enough. The case of developing country debt overhangs will have to 
be discussed in a much larger context of an overall development assistance strategy 
beyond the scope of this paper, as well as beyond the scope of an SDRM.  
 
Second, it is always possible to find a growth rate of GDP that is high enough 
for a country to become solvent at some point. When this is the central issue, then the 
entire institutional tinkering around an SDRM or CACs still do not adress the real 
problems. Indeed, a  great part of the underlying problems discussed in this paper lie in 
the policies and institutions of the debtor countries impeding economic development. 
The attempts by the international community (mainly the World Bank & IMF) to foster 
economic development with conditionality provisions in lending have neither been very 
succesful. A number of issues in the international economy are in the need of reform. If 
for example, trade liberalization is to foster economic growth, it needs to be a true 
„liberalization“ and allow for a positive transfer of resources to the developing world, 
eventually allowing growth and economic prosperity to materialize. It has not been 
within the scope of this paper to discuss all developing country policies in any 
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appropriate detail and trace their inefficiencies in complex sets of ideological, political 
or cultural realms. 
 
Third, why not get radical? The Bulow (2002) approach is one that achieves a 
solution which is less concerned with institutional tinkering but carries a long-term 
perspective. In the simple Bulow-world of complete sovereign immunity, only 
governments with sustainable economic policies would be receiving foreign capital. The 
Bulow-approach does bring considerable problems in the short and middle run that 
may even hinder it from ever becoming policy. But its eventual message hits the real 
problem: Let countries borrow as much as they want and see how creditors react! If 
this works, international sovereign lending would be radically guided by quality 
providing a real incentive for good policy efforts.  The Roubini (2002) critique on 
Bulow is also correct. None of the past sovereign debt crises was directly a sovereign 
debt crisis and to that end, eliminating the sovereign immunity waivers would not have 
directly addressed the problem. At the same time, it is certainly legitimate to ask what 
an SDRM could have done better. Left alone, presumably not much at all. Even the 
most recent case of Argentina that motivates so many contributions to submit a 
proposal to the “save-the-world-financial-game” could presumably not have been 
prevented with the SDRM alone. The path towards solutions lies much rather in the 
two measures identified as parts of the broad strategy in the Bulow approach: Eliminate 
the biase toward debt finance and keep the IFI out of bailouts. Both provisions are 
certainly easier proposed than implemented.   
 
Nevertheless the chances of CACs or the SDRM should not be written off too 
early. Whether the world settles for CACs or one day in the future builds up an SDRM-
like mechanism, the central objective should be clear: A succesful new sovereign 
bankruptcy procedure should provide a well-defined and predictable process that 
contributes to more certainty. An SDRM, given that it is broad in coverage, transparent 
in the process as well as unambigous and impartial in judgement is a step forward in 
this matter. Developing complex mandates that are intransparent in decision-making 
and leave room for broad discretion can cure symptoms but not the disease. When 
drafting bankruptcy procedures for sovereigns, one can certainly learn from basic 
provisions of domestic bankruptcy legislation. Yet the sovereign case entails a complex 
set of problems, be they in political and legal enforcement or simply in cultural 
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interpretation. Sovereign bankruptcy will never equal domestic bankruptcy, and in the 
end one cannot, and should not, try to rule out the pain of bankruptcy. In the moment 
that repudiation is painless, the bonding role of debt is undermined. This applies to 
sovereign states even more as it does to corporations. Much rather, the international 
community should try to move to a superior stance where pain poses a credible threat, 
yet is canalised to hurt along the principles of market efficiency.  
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A. Annex 
A.1. Time Inconsistency and Two Solutions119 
 
For the sake of argument, ignore all existing doubts on IMF policy and take IMF action 
for an indispensable remedy for the global financial system in the event of crisis, i.e. no 
action by the IMF yields the worst outcome for all parties involved. The dangers of this 
time consistency trap become apparent when looking at the game theory behind this 
setting in more detail. The basic intuition of this action can be illustrated in a game 
played by the IMF-plus-debtor and the creditor. To simplify, the IMF plays the role of 
itself and the debtor in one. Let nature define whether the state of an economy is 
“Good” or “Bad”.  
 
Figure 2.1. The time consistency trap and two proposals 
Nature
Bad State
Creditor
RolloverGrab Race
IMF
    (α , γ) (β- , β-) (δ , δ)
Good State
No ActionBail InBail Out
(α , α)
(β , β)
1-π πConstructive ambiguity
Creditor Payoff shown first
 
Source: Miller (2002), p. 8 
 
In this figure, α > β > β- > γ > δ holds. In the “Good” state the game is short as 
everyone wins, everyone is happy with a flourishing economy (debtor receives α) and 
high investment returns (creditor receives α).  However, in the “Bad” state where the 
                                                 
119 See Miller (2002), p. 4-6 
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debtor defaults, the creditor has the first-mover advantage, he can either “Grab” or 
“Rollover”. If the creditor rolls over the debt, both parties get β. A grab race by the 
creditor and a bailout by the IMF yields α for the creditor and γ for the IMF-plus 
debtor. The default payoff is δ for both. If the creditor chooses to rollover, no action is 
required by the IMF and the second-best equilibrium materializes. But when the tree is 
worked backward, the result under rational expectations reasoning is that the creditor 
chooses to grab. Suppose the IMF refuses to act. Looking at the game, this clearly 
neglects the order of play after a bad state of nature has emerged. The IMF is forced to 
bailout, since this outcome is strictly superior to doing nothing (γ > δ). The creditor 
knows this and therefore never agrees to rollover. 
 
Solutions  
 
1. The strategy of constructive ambiguity is a mixed strategy, where the IMF 
chooses “No action” with probability π and “Bailout” with probability (1-π). The 
creditor has an incentive to rollover, as long as expected payoff is less than β, i.e. 
(1-π)α+πδ<β. 
2. The option of a bail-in can be illustrated in the game tree between “Bail out” and 
“No Action”. Through an appropriate debt-write down the payoff for the creditor 
is less than under rollover, but since the payoff for IMF-plus-debtor is higher in 
case of bail-in than under bailout, the creditor will choose to bail-in.  
 
A.2. Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) vs. the IMF120 
 
1. Bagehots (1873) LOLR lends freely. The IMF cannot lend freely because it can run 
out of money (it is just a financial intermediary). 
2. Bagehots LOLR lends unconditionally. The IMF currently imposes ex-post 
conditionality. To function by clearly set rules, the conditionality would have to be 
ex ante in nature. Under the present system of “discretionary eclecticism”, the IMF 
cannot install preconditions and lend truly freely to everyone fulfilling them (See 
e.g. Tarullo 2001). 
                                                 
120 See also IFIAC (2000) 
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3. Bagehots LOLR lends with penalty rates. IMF lending is often perceived as 
subsidized (moral hazard). This point is discussed and empirically hard to test 
because one has to predict future repayments.  
4. Bagehots LOLR lends on good collateral. The IMF has no de jure force in its 
member countries. Some however argue that ex-post conditionality serves as quasi-
collateral (Cornelli/Felli 1995). 
 
B. Abbreviations 
 
CAC   Collective Action Clause 
 
FSIA   Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act (USA) 
 
FTAP   Fair and Transparent Arbitration Procedure 
 
IDRA   International Debt Restructuring Agency 
 
ILLR  International Lender of Last Resort  
 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
 
LOLR   Lender of Last Resort 
 
MAC   Majority Action Clauses 
 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
SDDRF Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum 
 
SDRM  Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
 
  -III-
C. References 
Bagehot, Walter (1873): Lombard Street. London: William Clowes and Sons 
Barro, Robert (1998): „The IMF Doesn’t Put Out Fires, It Starts Them“, Business Week 
(December 7), p.18  
Becker, Torbjörn, Richards, Anthony and Yungyong Thaicharoen, (2001): “Bond 
Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?”, IMF Working 
Paper 01/92 
Bundesministerum für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (BMZ): Wissenschaftl. Beirat 
(2000) Insolvenzregelungen: Internationale Insolvenz für Entwicklungsländer, 
Stellungnahme des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. BMZ Spezial Nr. 014 
Buchheit, Lee C. & Gulati, G. Mitu (2002): Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington D.C., Working Paper No. 34 
Bulow, Jeremy (2002): First World Governments and Third World Debt: A Bankruptcy Court 
for Sovereign Lending?, at 
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/pa
pers/200204_bulow.pdf visited 03.09.2002 
Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff, (1989): “A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign 
Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, pp. 156-78  
Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff, (1990): “Cleaning Up Third World Debt Without 
Getting Taken to the Cleaners”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, (4), pp. 31-42 
Calomiris, Charles W., (1998): “Blueprints for a New Global Financial Architecture”, 
unpublished manuscript at http://www.imfsite.org/reform/calomiris.html, 
visited 12.12.02 
Chamberlin, Michael M. (2002): Revisting the IMF´s Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposal and the 
Quest for More Orderly Sovereign Work-Outs, at 
http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/modcovc3.pdf visited 30.08.2002 
Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco, (1998): “Financial fragility and the exchange rate 
regime”, NBER working paper #6469 
Cline, William R.  (1995): International Debt Reexamined, Washington, Institute for 
International Economics 
Cline, William R. (2002): Private Sector Involvement: Defintion, Measurement and 
Implementation,, at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/conferences/conf0207/cline.pdf am 
30.08.2002 
Cohen, Benjamin J.  (1989): "A Global Chapter 11", Foreign Policy, n. 75, Summer, pp. 
109 ff 
  -IV-
Cornelli, Francesca and Leonardo Felli (1995): The Theory of Bankruptcy and Mechanism 
Design. In: Barry Eichengreen, Richard Portes (eds.) (1995). Crisis? What Crisis? 
Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors. London, CEPR: 69-85. 
Debevoise, Whitney (1984): “Exchange Controls and External Indebtedness: A Modest 
Proposal for A Deferral Mechanism Employing the Bretton Woods Concepts”, Houston 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 7 (Autumn), pp.157-68  
Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Isabel Schnabel and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, (2000): “Moral Hazard 
and International Crisis Lending: A Test”, at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-00/dgz.pdf, 20.01.03 
Diamond, Douglas W. and Philip H. Dybvig, (1983): “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), pp. 401-419 
Dieter, Heribert (2002): Paukenschlag in Washington, in Entwicklung und 
Zusammenarbeit, Jg. 43, 2002:1, S. 26 
Dixon, Liz and David Wall, (2000): “Collective action problems and collective action clauses”, 
Financial Stability Review (June 2000), Bank of England 
Dooley, Michael P., (2000): “Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises Be 
Avoided?”, NBER Working Paper #7531 
Dooley, Michael P. and Sujata Verma (2001): Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following 
Crises, NBER Working Paper  
Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz, (1981): “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis”, Review of Economic Studies, 48, 289-309 
Eaton, Jonathan, (2002): “Standstills and an International Bankruptcy Court”, Photocopy. 
Eichengreen, Barry (1999):Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical 
Post-Asia Agenda, Institute for International Economics: Washington D.C. 
Eichengreen, Barry (2000): Can the Moral Hazard Caused by IMF Bailouts be Reduced?, 
Geneva Reports on the World Economy Special Resport 1, August   
Eichengreen, Barry (2001). Crisis Prevention and Management, Any New Lessons from 
Argentina and Turkey, at 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/pub/users/eichengr/crisis101901.pdf visited 
30.08.2002 
Eichengreen, Barry (2002): Why We Need a Krueger-Like Process to Obtain a Taylor-Like 
Result," at  http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/iiekrueger.pdf  visited 
12.12.02   
Eichengreen, Barry and Richard Portes (Ed.) (1995): Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly 
Workouts for Sovereign Debtors. London, CEPR 
Eichengreen, Barry and Ashoka Mody, (2000): “Would Collective Action Clauses Raise 
Borrowing Costs?”, NBER Working Paper #7458 
Erlassjahr.de (2002a): Arbeitspapier zum Konzept eines Fairen und Transparenten 
Schiedsverfahrens (FTAP), on http://www.erlassjahr.de, visited 28.08.2002 
  -V-
Erlassjahr.de (2002b): International Insolvency/Arbitration: Arguments and Counterarguments, 
at http://www.erlassjahr.de, visited 28.08.2002 
Fernandéz-Arias, Eduardo and Ricardo Hausmann (2000): The Redesign of the International 
Financial Architecture from Latin American Perspective: Who Pays the Bill?, Inter-
American Development Bank, Working Paper 440. 
Fischer, Stanley (1999): On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (4): 85-104 
Ghosal, Sayantan and Marcus Miller (2002): Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and 
Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures, University of Warwick, CSGR Working Paper. 
Greenwood, Christopher and Hugh Mercer (1995): Considerations of International Law. In: 
Barry Eichengreen, Richard Portes (eds.), Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for 
Sovereign Debtors. London, CEPR 
Group of 10 (G10 – Rey Report) (1996): Resolving Sovereign Liquidity Crises (Washington: 
G-10), at , visited 08.09.2002 http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf
Group of 22 (G-22) (1998): Report of the Working Group on International Financial Crises, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/htm1/extdr/ifa-reports/index.htm, visited 
20.09.2002 
Haldane, Andy and Mark Kruger, (2001): “The Resolution of International Financial Crises: 
Private Finance and Public Funds”, Bank of Canada Working Paper 2001-20  
Hurlock, James (1995): The way ahead for sovereign debt, Euromoney (August), pp. 78-79 
IFIAC (2000): International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission. Report to Congress, at 
, visited 20.09.2002 http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm
IMF Public Information Notice (2003): IMF Board Discusses Possible Features of an SDRM, 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0306.htm 
International Monetary Fund (1944): „Articles of Agrrement of the IMF“, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/, visited 10.01.2003  
Jeanne, Olivier (2001): Sovereign Debt Crisis and the International Financial Architecture, IMF 
and CEPR, at http://icg.harvard.edu/~ec2540/Papers/Jeanne.pdf visited 
30.08.2002 
Kaeser, Daniel (1990): “Pour un systeme equitable de desendettement”, Domaine Public, 
November 1, 1990. Lausanne, CH, in Rogoff/Zettelmeyer (2002), pp. 8-10 
Kaiser, Jürgen (2001a): "Debt Management à la Louis XVI - A Short Promenade through the 
Programme and Practice of the Paris Club", June 2001, 
 http://www.jubileeplus.org/analysis/analysis.htm
Kaiser, Jürgen (2001b): Erlassjahr.de und der IWF – unterschiedliche Ansichten zu einem 
internationalen Insolvenzverfahren, auf http://www.erlassjahr.de, visited 10.09.2002  
Klimenko, Mikhail (2000): Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and 
the Recent Evolution of Sovereign Debt Renegotiations”, in Journal of International 
Economics, Fall 2002. 
  -VI-
Kremer, Michael and Seema Jayachandran (2002): Odious Debt, in Finance and 
Development, June 2002, IMF, Washington D.C., pp. 36-9 
Krueger, Anne (2001): "International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring", Speech at the National Economists’ Club Annual 
Members’ Dinner, Washington DC, November 26, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm visited 
23.08.2002 
Krueger, Anne (2002a): “New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring – an Update of our 
Thinking“, Speech at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, on April 1st, , at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm 
Krueger, Anne, (2002b): “Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Dispute Resolution”, 
Speech at the Bretton Woods Committee Annual Meeting, June 6th, at 
2002.http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/060602.htm 
Krueger, Anne (2002c): Preventing and Resolving Financial Crises: The Role of Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, Speech Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, 27. 
Juli 2002, on July 27th 2002, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/072602.htm  
Krueger, Anne (2002d): Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – One Year Later, 
December 10, Speech at the European Commission Dec 10th , at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/121002.htm 
Krueger, Anne (2003): Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Messy or Messier, Speech given at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Washington, D.C. - 
January 04, 2003 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/010403.htm 
Krugman, Paul, (1988): “Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang”, Journal of Development 
Economics 29, pp. 79-100 
Krugman, Paul (1999): “The Return of Depression Economics”, New York 
Kydland, Finn and Edward Prescott, (1977): “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of 
optimal plans”, Journal of Political Economy, 85. pp. 619-637. 
Lane, Timothy and Steven Phillips, (2000): “Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?”, 
IMF Working Paper 00/168 
Lerrick, Adam and Allan H. Meltzer, (2001): “Blueprint for an International Lender of Last 
Resort”, unpublished manuscript, Carnegie-Mellon University 
Lerrick, Adam & Meltzer, Allan H. (2002): Sovereign Default. The Private Sector can Resolve 
Bankruptcy without a formal court, Quarterly International Economics Report, April 
2002, Carnegie Mellon, at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/bank.pdf, 
30.08.2002 
Malagardis, Antonis N.  (1990): Ein Konkursrecht für Staaten? Zur Regelung von Insolvenzen 
souveräner Schuldner in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, Nomos, Baden-Baden 
  -VII-
Miller, Marcus (2002): Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts or No 
Change, in Internationaol Economics Policy Briefs, Number PB02-3, Institute for 
International Economics, at http://www.iie.com/policybriefs/news02-3.pdf 
visited 27.08.2002 
Miller, Marcus & Joseph Stiglitz (1999): Bankruptcy Protection against macroeconomic shocks: 
the case for a super Chapter 11, at www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CSGR/glob-
fin/milrstig.pdf visited 27.08.2002 
Miller, Marcus & Lei Zhang (1999): Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a 
Payments Standstill, CSGR Working Paper No. 35/99, Warwick 
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin, (1998): “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-
Fulfilling Attacks”, American Economic Review, (88), pp. 587-597 
Nunnenkamp, Peter (1995): Why Can't a Country be Like a Firm? Economist, April 22nd: 
p. 89. 
Nunnenkamp, Peter (2001): Umbaupläne und Reparaturarbeiten an der internationalen 
Finanzarchitektur: Eine Zwischenbilanz aus deutscher Perspektive, Kieler Arbeitspapiere 
Nr. 1078, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (1996): International Macroeconomics. Harvard 
University Press 
Paulus, Christoph G. (2002a): On the Way Towards International Rules for State Insolvencies, 
Speech given March 25th 2002, at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/international/resources.html visited 25.08.2002 
Paulus, Christoph G. (2002b) : Ein Insolvenzverfahrensrecht für Staaten, BMZ Gutachten. 
Photocopy 
Pettifor, Ann (2001): "Arbitration, Insolvency and Limited Liability: Their Relevance to Debtor 
Nations" , http://www.jubileeplus.org/analysis/analysis.htm 
Pettifor, Ann (2002): Resolving international debt crises – the Jubilee Framework for international 
insolvency, at 
http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/analysis/reports/jubilee_framework.html 
visited 30.08.2002 
Pieper, Stefan-Ulrich (2002): Völkerrechtliche Aspekte der Einführung eines Insolvenzrechts für 
Staaten, presentation at conference „Die Diskussion um ein Insolvenzrecht für 
Staaten“January 17-19. 2002, Katholisch-soziale Akademie Franz Hitze Haus, 
Münster. Photocopy 
Porzecanski, Arturo (2002): A critique of sovereign bankruptcy initiatives, ABN AMRO Bank 
Paper, at http://www.emta.org/keyper/porzeca2.pdf visited 26.08.2002 
Radelet, Steven &  Jeffrey Sachs (1999): What Have We Learned, So Far, from the Asian 
Financial Crisis? Working Paper, at 
http://www.stern.nyuedu/~nroubini/asia/AsianCrisis.pdf visited 15.08.2002 
Raffer, Kunibert (1990): Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically 
Efficient Solution with a Human Face, in World Development, 18 (2). pp. 301-111. 
  -VIII-
Raffer, Kunibert (2000):  Kommentar zum Gutachten über internationale Insolvenz des BMZ-
Beirats, Enquete-Kommission ”Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft” 
Arbeitsgruppe ”Finanzmärkte” – 14/96 at www.bundestag.de/gremien/welt/ 
welt_1texte/welt_ag11496.pdf, visited 24.08.2002 
Raffer, Kunibert (2001): Debt Relief for Low Income Countries: Arbitration as the Alternative to 
Present Unsuccessful Debt Strategies, at 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2001-2/conference2001-
2.htm visited 20.08.2002 
Raffer, Kunibert (2002):  Sovereign Debt Workout Arrangements, at http://www.new-
rules.org/Conference/conference.html visited 30.08.2002. 
Rogoff, Kenneth (1999): International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (4), pp. 21-42. 
Rogoff, Kenneth (2002): “Moral Hazard in IMF Loans How Big a Concern?“, Finance and 
Development, Sep 2002, Volume 39, Nr. 3.  
Rogoff, Kenneth & Jeromin Zettelmayer (2002): "The History of Sovereign 
Bankruptcy: A History of Ideas", IMF Working Paper  WP/02/133 
Roubini, Nouriel (2002b) : Do we need a new international bankruptcy regime? Comments on 
Bulow, Sachs and White, at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/bankreg.doc 
visited 30.08.2002 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. (1984): “Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing”, Princeton Studies in 
International Finance 54, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. (1995): Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort? Frank D. 
Graham Lecture, Princeton University (April), at 
http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/hiidpapers/intllr.PDF visited 30.08.2002 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2002): Resolving the Debt-Crisis for Low-Income Countries, at 
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/pa
pers/200204_sachs.pdf  visited 30.08.2002 
Schwarcz, Steven L. (2000): Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, Duke University Law Review Working Paper 
Smith, Adam (1776): Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Reprint 
(1991), Prometheus, New York 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2002): Globalization and its Discontents, London 
Summers, Larry (1999): The Right Kind of IMF for a Stable Global Financial System, speech 
given at the London School of Business, Dec. 14, 1999 in Tarullo (2001).  
Tarullo, Daniel K. (2001): “Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Reform”, 
Journal of International Economic Law, pp. 613-682 
Taylor, John (2002a): Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Speech at "Sovereign 
Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards, Institute for International Economics 
  -IX-
Washington, DC 2. April 2002, at www.iie.com/papers/taylor0402.htm visited 
30.08.2002 
Taylor, John (2002b): Using Clauses to Reform the Process for Sovereign Debt Workouts: 
Progress and Next Steps, Speech at EMTA Annual Meeting, Dec 5, 2002 
Terberger-Stoy, Eva (2002): Koreferat zu Paulus, Überlegungen zu einem Insolvenzverfahrensrecht 
für Staaten, Presentation at conference „Die Diskussion um ein Insolvenzrecht 
für Staaten“January 17-19. 2002, Katholisch-soziale Akademie Franz Hitze 
Haus, Münster. Photocopy 
UNCTAD (1998, 2001): Trade and Development Report 1998, 2001, UN, Geneva 
9 United States Code (USC): Chapter 9 – Adjustement of Debts of a Municipality, Photocopy 
White, Michelle (2002): Sovereigns in Distress: Do they Need Bankruptcy?, at 
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/pa
pers/200204_white.pdf visited 30.08.2002 
World Wide Web Resources. 
Bank of International Settlements at www.bis.org 
International Monetary Fund at www.imf.org 
International Insolvency Institute at www.iiiglobal.com 
Paris Club at www.clubdeparis.org 
United Nations Commission on Trade and Development www.unctad .org 
World Bank Group at www.worldbank.org 
  -X-
